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Abstract
Environment related decision making in developing countries has been widely concerned
because of the weak institution and high vulnerability to environmental risks and changes.
However, empirical studies on these perspectives, especially quantitative analysis, are still
quite limited due to data limitations. This dissertation empirically explore both governmen-
tal and households behaviors in a series of environmental decisions: dam construction, ty-
phoon relief, water and electricity consumption in China, using both officially reported data
and micro-level data collected in the field. In general, both governments and households
respond to internal and external environmental shocks using their own tools, by adjusting
governmental transfers or water and electricity consumptions. The last chapter discusses
what are the implications of these findings on environment management and sustainable
development.
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Decision making related to natural environment is complex due to externalities and uncer-
tainties associated with the environment system. Besides quantifying the externality and
uncertainty of environmental elements (such as ground water depletion, climate change and
natural disasters etc), it is also key to understand how externalities and uncertainties inter-
act with the behaviors of various decision makers. This is especially true in the context of
developing countries, because not only they are more vulnerable to environmental changes
due to the low income level and weak institutions, but also they may impact the environment
more for future economic growth expectations.
Governments, enterprises and individuals are the three main types of decision makers
in the economy and environment system. Comparing to governments and individuals, en-
terprises make decisions more straightforwardly and just maximize profits under the price
signal which may be comprehensively decided by governments and the market. The objec-
tive functions of governments and individuals are less clear, varying over institutional, social,
cultural and economic contexts.
2Studies on governmental decision behaviors on environment related perspectives have fo-
cused a lot on bottom-up decision systems, which are widely adopted by developed countries.
In this type of systems, governments make decisions on regulation setting, public good and
service provision and income redistribution after incorporating environment factors. Gov-
ernments face incentives of direct voting or voting with feet by individuals. There have been
many empirical studies evaluating governments’ decisions and individual response to these
decisions, such as pollution regulation, environmental tax and relief transfers (Besley and
Rosen, 1998;Eisensee and Strömberg, 2007).
However, studies on governmental decision making for environment are still quite limited
in top-down systems (Burgess et al., 2012). In this type of systems, governments face an
additional incentive to “impress" the upper-level governments. Even though the wellbeing of
local individuals are included in the performance evaluation, information asymmetry makes
the system easy to be sabotaged by corruption, bureaucracy and many unobservable factors
such as governors’ preferences and social network. To understand the system well, a lot
of empirical studies on governmental decisions are needed to provide basic knowledge and
information on the “gray-box" of governmental decision system. One main challenge for
these studies is to identify an exogenous change which triggers the governmental decision
system and then evaluate the social, economic and environmental impacts of these changes.
Equity and efficiency have been widely agreed to be the main rules evaluating govern-
mental decisions. This requires the incorporation of individual preference, which needs a lot
of inputs on basic knowledge about individual preferences and behaviors. This dissertation
aims to provide basic empirical supports of governmental decision evaluation by observ-
ing both governmental and individual behaviors on a series of decision making problems.
Specifically, it includes two studies on governmental decision making on public projects and
disaster relief and one study on individual behaviors (Chapter 2 & 3) of water and electricity
consumption (Chapter 4) in the context of China.
31.2 Approach
The papers in this dissertation are all empirical studies. Chapter 2 studies how hydropower
dam projects impact local counties and how the central government use intergovernmental
transfers to balance uneven impacts across regions. Chapter 3 also studies the intergov-
ernmental transfer behavior, but focusing on a different type of environment problems: ty-
phoons. It estimates the efforts of the central government using intergovernmental transfers
to help local disaster relief. These two papers represent the main functions of intergovern-
mental transfers: public investment, fiscal equalization and risk sharing. Two types of fiscal
federalism models are built separately to explain governmental responsiveness to internally
initiated projects and external natural shocks. Chapter 4 is a micro-level study on household
water and electricity consumption behaviors in rural China. It especially explores how local
households adjust their consumption in face of weather variabilities.
A variety of data from different sources are used for the empirical analysis, including
officially reported data, manually collected data through internet resources and field collected
data . The first two studies use a combination of governmental reported economic and fiscal
data and remote sensing satellite data at county level. A complete list of all dams above
100 meters in China are manually collected based on internet resources. The third study
uses household data on water and electricity bills in a rural village of Northern China. Basic
econometric approaches, including difference-in-difference, first-difference and fixed effects
regressions are used to analyze data.
In the dissertation, the two governmental studies and the household study are not directly
linked to each other. To meet the goal of evaluating governmental decisions comprehensively
by incorporating governmental and households behaviors together, future research on wider
range of governmental policies and household behaviors are needed to bridge the gap.
41.3 Chapter summaries
Chapter 2: Dams and Intergovernmental Transfer: Are Dam Projects Pareto Im-
proving in China? In Chapter 2, using the geographic variation of dam impacts based
on distances to the river and distances to dams, I use difference-in-difference approach to
estimate dam impacts at county level in China from 1996 to 2010. The results indicate that
dam-site counties significantly benefit from dam projects, while upstream counties signifi-
cantly get harmed. A large-scale dam increases the revenue in dam-site counties by 13-20%,
and decreases the revenue in upstream counties to 7-16% after the projects begins. Further
downstream counties suffer from rice yield decrease by more than 5%, even though their
overall economy are not significantly impacted. The central government increases transfers
to upstream counties by 7-13%, which compensates the revenue losses quite well. Both the
revenue and transfer impact estimates show geographic heterogeneities. The closer a county
is to a dam, the larger the impacts will be. When combining the changes in governmen-
tal revenue and net transfers, the results indicate that large-scale dam projects in China
are close to the Pareto improvement outcomes in the perspective of governmental economic
performance. One concern of this study is that ecosystem impacts are not included in the
analysis. The results are only based on the balance sheets of governments. It should be
cautious to apply the conclusions to the whole macro economy.
Chapter 3: Transfer for Disasters: Governmental Responsiveness to Typhoon
Risks in China (with Solomon Hsiang and Daiju Narita). In Chapter 3, Solomon
Hsiang, Daiju Narita and I examine central government’s efforts of making transfers to help
typhoon relief in local governments. Local macroeconomic performance measured by per
capita GDP is not significantly damaged by typhoon exposures. The central government in-
creases special transfer with targeted purposes to local regions for the current year typhoon
5exposure. On average, local regions receive 5% more special transfers when the average max-
imum wind speed increases by 10m/s. However, general transfers which are non-targeting
transfers, barely change along with typhoon exposures. Transfers respond to local vulnera-
bility prioritively. The increasing transfer efforts target mainly at poor regions and regions
suffered from severe typhoons with high average maximum wind speed. Transfer respon-
siveness is not significantly associated with population density, ethnicity group composition
and number of peer competing counties within the same prefecture. Neither the “province
manages county" reform nor political connection impact special transfer responsiveness. One
thing to note is that the estimate in this paper might be a lower bound of the actual disaster
transfer responsiveness, because disaster transfer is only a small part of total special transfer
which is analyzed in the paper.
Chapter 4: Water, Electricity and Weather Variability in Rural Northern China.
In Chapter 4, I examine household water and electricity use behaviors, especially the impacts
of weather variabilities on these behaviors, using household data in a water-scarce rural
village in Northern China. I find that smaller families tend to increase per capita water
and electricity consumptions by more than 20% for one less family member. Households
with more women in the family have higher water and electricity consumptions even when
controlling the family size. Both water and electricity consumptions increase in hotter or
drier months. Smaller households are more sensitive to weather variabilities by increasing
water use more in face of temperature increases. One concern of the study is that local
households occasionally use ground water as an alternative of the metered pipe water. The
estimates derived in this paper for weather responsiveness of water use should be interpreted
as a lower bound of the true water responses.
6Chapter 2
Dams and Intergovernmental Transfer: Are Dam
Projects Pareto Improving in China?
7Abstract
Large-scale dams are controversial public infrastructure projects due to the unevenly dis-
tributed benefits and losses to local regions. The central government can make redistributive
fiscal transfers to attenuate the impacts and reduce the inequality among local governments,
but whether large-scale dam projects are Pareto improving is still a question. Using the
geographic variation of dam impacts based on distances to the river and distances to dams,
this paper adopts a difference-in-difference approach to estimate dam impacts at county
level in China from 1996 to 2010. I find that a large-scale dam reduces local revenue in
upstream counties significantly by 16%, while increasing local revenue by similar magnitude
in dam-site counties. The negative revenue impacts in upstream counties are mitigated by
intergovernmental transfers from the central government, with an increase rate around 13%
during the dam construction and operation periods. No significant revenue and transfer
impacts are found in downstream counties, except counties far downstream. These results
suggest that dam-site counties benefit from dam projects the most, and intergovernmental
transfers help to balance the negative impacts of dams in upstream counties correspondingly,
making large-scale dam projects close to Pareto improving outcomes in China.
2.1 Introduction
Many countries invest heavily on infrastructure projects to stimulate economic development
and reduce poverty. The annual infrastructure investment in China amounted to more than
20% of national gross domestic product (GDP) in the past decade, covering public and private
infrastructure projects on energy, transportation, primary natural resources, public facilities,
hydrological and agricultural infrastructures. These projects bring uneven impacts to local
regions, with benefits like economic production, increasing employment, lower transaction
and transportation cost for the society and spillover benefits to other industries1 and losses
like involuntary migration, crowding-out traditional industries and social structure change2
etc. Governments use redistributive intergovernmental transfers to balance the economic
impacts of large projects on local governments. Given the coexistence of benefits and losses
caused by the infrastructure projects, is the governmental redistribution system effective
to mitigate the negative impacts? Are infrastructure projects Pareto improving under the
governmental redistribution system? Are regions equally benefitting from the infrastructure
projects?
I particularly focus on large-scale dams in China, i.e. dams with height above 100 meters
to answer the above questions, for three considerations. First, large-scale dams bring huge
economic impacts to a wide range of areas. There are 142 large-scale dams, i.e. dams with
height above 100 meters in China by 2010, contributing to 40% of total hydropower gener-
ation capacity and 44% of water storage capacity 3. Second, dam impacts show significant
geographic characteristics. Once the dam wall divides a river basin into three sections, up-
1See Aschauer (1989), Munnell (1990), Haughwout (1998) , Fernald (1999) and Banerjee et al. (2012) for
transportation infrastructures, Greenstein and Spiller (1995) and Nadiri et al. (2009) for telecommunication
infrastructures, De Long and Summers (1991) for other types of infrastructures.
2See Brocker et al. (2010) and Meijers et al. (2012) for related researches.
3Hydropower contributes to around 16% of total power generation in 2010 in China.
9stream, dam-site and downstream regions, each region will be exposed to different benefits
and risks from the same dam project, making the uneven impacts observable at the admin-
istrative government level. Third, most large-scale dam projects are approved by the central
government (Ministry of Water Resources) in China, which provides a social and economic
context with more concentrated governmental involvement in the dam decision making and
intergovernmental redistribution.
To analyze the governmental redistributive system, I first introduce a simple fiscal feder-
alism model representing the multi-level governments’ decision making process on intergov-
ernmental transfers and infrastructure approvals, following the model setup for intergovern-
mental fiscal relationship by Zou (2012) and Slack (1980). The model implies that no region
should be worse-off from a publicly approved dam project and negative revenue impacts will
be mitigated by intergovernmental transfers if the redistribution system is effective. Total
economic impacts of dam projects on a local government are composed by the local revenue
impacts and external transfers impacts. Following this framework, I also provide the first
empirical analysis on governmental redistribution mechanism reflected from the fiscal trans-
action for large-scale dam projects, with analysis unit at county level in China. Most of the
current literatures on empirical economic impact estimates of dam projects are about the
overall economic impacts in terms of economic production or income to a region(Duflo and
Pande, 2007, Strobl and Strobl, 2011, Hansen et al., 2009, Chakravarty, 2011 and Lipscomb
et al., 2011). This paper takes an additional step to separate the local revenue and external
transfer effects from dam projects, besides the overall economic impacts.
The paper covers 136 large-scale dams after the crosscheck of officially reported dam
locations and Google Earth images. These dams normally serve multiple functions, including
hydropower generation, flood control, irrigation, navigation, water supply and tourism. The
overall economic impact of a dam on a specific region depends strongly on the relative
distance between the region and the dam and the perpendicular distance between the region
10
and the river. Upstream areas are subject to inundation risks and water use restrictions, as
well as irrigation, navigation and tourism benefits. Dam-site areas where the dam is located
are subject to electricity generation benefits, inundation and pollution risks. Downstream
areas benefit from reduced flooding risks and irrigations, while they are also subject to
reduced water flow and higher drought risks. The perpendicular distance to the river also
matters for dam impacts on a specific region. Most of impacts, such as irrigation, flood
control, hydropower generation and inundation, rely on the water flow4. Areas located close
to the river will be impacted by the hydrological changes more than areas further away.
Using geographic variation of dam impacts, I adopt a difference-in-difference(DID) ap-
proach to explore the differences between counties directly impacted by dams as the treat-
ment counties and similar counties not impacted by dams as the control counties, before and
after the dam construction to get unbiased estimates of dam impacts in the construction
and operation periods. I obtain estimates separately for three main areas along the river:
upstream, dam-site and downstream regions. Because the DID approach uses the informa-
tion of existing distribution of dam locations, estimates of dam impacts are robust to the
fact that dam locations may be not exogenous to the economic performance.
I define treatment counties as counties with geographic centroids located within 20km
away from the river, and control counties as counties with geographic centroids located
slightly further away. Because upstream counties are normally wider and larger than down-
stream counties, upstream control counties are defined as these located in the band of 20km
to 100km away from the river, while downstream control counties are defined as these lo-
cated in the band of 20km to 50km away from the river. Considering that the average size of
counties in China is around 400 square kilometers, treatment counties are almost the closest
4The paper doesn’t include the analysis on power supply beyonds electricity generation. Because the
electricity supply destination are mostly large regions, such as East China or North China, depending on
contracts for individual dams, control and treat counties are likely to enjoy similar electricity supply benefits.
the difference-in-difference estimates will not capture the electricity supply benefits.
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layer of counties along the river, while control counties are counties located close to treat-
ment counties, but slightly away from the river. To link counties and dams, I assume that
the nearest dam impacts treatment counties the most, which is empirically verified. Control
counties are used repeatedly for multiple dams. This categorization on countries also pro-
vides a group of treatment and control counties linking to the same dam for all locations.
Following this definition, treatment and control counties show similar pre-dam trends for
most economic and demographic variables, meeting the assumption for DID estimation.
The first set of results is on governmental fiscal revenues, which covers tax and fee revenue
collected from the local administrative region. The results indicate that dam-site counties
significantly benefit from dam projects, while upstream counties significantly get harmed.
The revenue impacts of dam operation is larger than that of dam construction, considering
that dam only functions partially in the construction period. A large-scale dam increases the
revenue in the dam-site counties by 12.9% during the dam construction period and 19.9%
during the dam operation period. Upstream counties, however, suffer a 16.5% decrease
in per capita governmental revenue during the operation period and 7.5% decrease during
the construction period. Downstream counties are not significantly impacted. Negative
impacts in the upstream counties are not all from inundation and resettlement losses, but
also potentially from other changes, such as long-term social and economic disruptions and
water use restriction in the upstream. Most of the revenue impacts to the dam-site counties
are from hydropower generation benefits.
The second set of results is on net intergovernmental transfers received by local county
governments. Both the upstream and dam-site counties receive more transfer. However,
the transfer effect is much larger in the dam construction period than that in the dam
operation period. Per capita transfer into upstream counties increases by 13.6% during
the construction period and 6.7% insignificantly during the operation period. The transfer
to dam-site counties increase by more than 16% in both periods. The transfer effect in
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downstream counties is not significant. Increases in net transfers into upstream counties
sufficiently mitigate the negative revenue impacts in the upstream counties.
Both the revenue and transfer impact estimates show geographic heterogeneities. The
closer a county is to a dam, the larger the impacts will be. Counties located within 200km
away from the dam along the river are subject to the largest distributive impacts. Counties
in the far downstream suffer a loss in total revenue and agricultural yield. The impacts
are also heterogeneous for the designed purposes of dams. Hydropower dams bring larger
distributive impacts than irrigational dams.
When combining dam impacts on governmental revenue and net transfers, the result in-
dicates that large-scale dam projects in China are close to the Pareto improvement outcomes
in the perspective of governmental economic performance. However, the benefits distribute
unevenly. Local dam-site counties capture most of the benefits. Downstream counties get
slightly worse off, but the impact estimates are not statistically significant. The results on the
macro economic performance of GDP show similar patterns, except that upstream counties
also getting worse off. This indicates that even though the transfers attenuate the negative
impacts to a certain extent, the magnitude of transfers to the upstream and downstream
counties are smaller than the optimal level. The uneven economic impacts on different re-
gions imply that the central government put a larger decision weight on the dam-site counties
comparing to others when making fiscal redistributions. It reveals that counties with the
geography suitable for building dams have larger decision weights.
The above results are robust to subsample analysis and other estimate specifications.
Falsification tests verify the credibility of the classification of treatment and control counties,
and classification of time periods to capture the impacts. The main results on dam-site
county benefits and upstream compensations are robust to the data collapse methodology
proposed by Bertrand et al. (2004) to correct the serial correlation concerns caused by DID
analysis using long time series data
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To my knowledge this is the first paper not only studying economic impacts of large-scale
projects, but also exploring the governmental redistributive efforts for economic impacts
of projects, by separating the internal governmental revenue and external governmental
redistribution impacts for large projects in China. It contributes to the large literatures
on dam impacts (Duflo and Pande, 2007, Strobl and Strobl, 2011, Hansen et al., 2009,
Chakravarty, 2011 and Lipscomb et al., 2011), infrastructure and development (Aschauer,
1989 and Banerjee et al., 2012) and intergovernmental transfers (Sole-Olle and Sorribas-
Navarro, 2008 and Zou, 2012). The findings can provide policy implications on the welfare
impacts of hydropower dams and intergovernmental redistribution decision making in China.
The following part begins with an introduction on dams and intergovernmental transfers
in China. Section III shows a theoretical model for intergovernmental transfer decision
process of infrastructure projects. Section IV discusses the data collection for empirical
analysis. Section V introduced the DID approach. Section VI presents the results, robustness
analysis and policy implications of the results. Section VII concludes.
2.2 Dams and Intergovernmental Transfer in China
There have been 24,119 dams built in China by 2008, accounting to more than 50% of total
dams in the world. Even though the overall dam construction speed has slowed down since
the 1990s’, the speed of large-scale dam construction, i.e. dams with height above 100 meters
has accelerated5(see Table 2.1). On average, there were 1.3 large-scale dams built every year
before 1988. The number rose to 4.8 between 1989 and 2005 (CHINCOLD, 2008). More
large dams will be built in the next 10 years6. Large-scale dams are strategically important
5The technology development in arch and buttress dams makes it possible to use less concrete and soil
for construction of larger and taller dams.
6The installed hydropower capacity is expected to reach 320 GW in 2020, doubling the 2008 level according
to the midterm and longterm development plan for renewable energy (NDRC, 2007). More than 100 GW
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for renewable energy generation and water regulation in China.
In the following section, I first introduce large-scale dam projects in China. Then I explain
potential economic benefits and losses related to these dams. Following that, I describe the
intergovernmental transfer system in China.
2.2.1 Large-scale Dams in China
In China, dams are classified into 6 categories, large I, large II, medium, small I, small II
and others7 based to the scale of the reservoir. The decision making process differentiates
for dams of different categories. Higher-ranked dams require approval from higher level of
governments. 98% of dams with height above 100 meters are classified as large I hydrological
projects, which need the approval from the central government. Dams with lower heights and
smaller reservoirs are more likely to be approved by provincial or prefectural governments.
Besides that, dam above 100 meters is a category routinely reported in dam statistics and
local economic reports, even though there is no specific technical differences between dams
above 100 meters and those slightly below the bar. This may provide a small nudging effect
for the decision makers to propose dam projects with height above 100 meters instead of
projects below the bar when they have the option to built dams with heights close to 100
meters. This phenomenon may occur when local governments use dam projects to signal
local governor performances. Figure 2.4 plots the distribution of dam heights for new dams
above 30 meters from 1996 to 2003. It shows that when the dam height is close to 100 meters,
they are more likely to exceed 100 meters than below it. In the rest of the paper, dams above
100 meters will be called as large-scale dams. By focusing on this specific category of dams,
will be from dams above 100 meters.
7Large I projects: reservoir> 1 billion cubic meters; Large II projects: 0.1-1 billion cubic meters; Medium
projects: 10-100 million cubic meters; Small I projects: 1-10 million cubic meters; Small II projects: 0.1-1
million cubic meters; and others.
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the analysis can provide implications on redistribution mechanisms of central-approved large
dam projects.
Large-scale dams normally serve multiple functions, including hydropower generation,
irrigation, flood control, water supply, navigation and tourism. To meet these functions, a
dam wall is built on the river, storing water in the reservoir behind the wall and releasing
water downstream for specific purposes. The main dam operation scheme is to decide when
and how much to store and release water. Most dams have a net storage in the dry winter
and early spring, and then a net release in the late spring and early summer to prepare for
summer floods.
On average, a large-scale dam costs around 1 billion CNY (140 million US Dollar) in
the 2002 price level. The average dam construction period is around 7 years. These dams
are mostly co-financed by the state-owned electricity company, financial institutions, the
central government and local governments, with most of the investments from companies
and financial institutions8.
The approval process of large-scale dam projects follows a bottom-up structure, requiring
proposals from local governments and approval by the central government. First, regional
governments or river basin committees frame the five-year plan about hydropower develop-
ment in the river basin, under the guidance of national hydrological infrastructure develop-
ment plan released by the central government. The national hydropower development plan
includes expected goals of hydropower capacity and renewable energy capacity. Once the
regional five-year plan is approved by the state council, local electricity companies, mostly
state-owned, will submit project proposals, including the information of dam site choice,
8For example, Ertan Dam located in the upstream of Yangtze was financed by State Development In-
vestment Corp and Sichuan Investment Energy Corp at the proportion of 52:48. Three Gorges Dam was
financed by the Three Gorges Construction Fund sponsored by the central government, Three Gorges Com-
pany and the electricity revenue after 2003, loans from China Development Bank and the Three Gorges
Bond.
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technological and initial feasibility study reports. Third, the central government approves
the project proposal, and then the construction work can begin9. Local governments have
limited decision power on the location and design of dams.
In addition to the governments’ direct involvement in approving and investing on dam
projects, they also have the administrative authority to make regulations and policy guide-
lines, such as environmental protection regulations on water use distribution. There have
been environmental regulations restricting polluting industry development in the upstream
to protect the water quality in reservoir, and guidelines on water use privilege if there were
droughts or floods(MEP, 2008 and MWR, 2005). Even though I will not specifically estimate
specific economic impacts of these regulations separately, I expect to capture their overall
economics impacts from the macro economic performance outcomes.
2.2.2 Benefits and Losses from Large-scale Dams
By changing the hydrological cycle of the river, dams impact areas along the river differently
depending on the relative location of the local county and the dam. A dam wall divides
the whole river basin into three sections, upstream, dam-site and downstream regions. Up-
stream regions are areas behind the dam wall. It is also called the catchment region, where
the reservoir will be located and where the storage water will be originated from. Dam-site
regions are areas where the dam is located and where construction activities occur. Down-
stream regions are areas where the reservoir water flow to. They are also called as command
regions of the dam. Large-scale dams often serve multiple economics and service functions,
including hydropower generation, water supply, irrigation and flood control.
Hydropower generation is one of the main functions from large-scale dams. Dam-site
regions capture most of the direct revenues from electricity generation, including tax revenue
9Yangliuhu Dam is the only one that was disapproved by the central government.
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increase and potential increased job opportunities. Local regions may also benefit from other
indirect revenue impacts. For example, dam construction work can bring infrastructure
improvement benefits, such as roads, telecommunication, sanitation accesses. Even though
electricity provision is believed to be one of the social benefits due to the low hydropower
costs10, it will not be included in the benefit analysis of this paper. One reason is that the
specific benefiting region of power provision is difficult to be identified. Electricity benefits
can spread to the whole nation or a major part of the nation through the grid system. Most
of the large-scale power plants in West China11 are now contracted to serve East China12
under the national policy of “West-East Electricity Transfer” since 200113. Electricity supply
benefits spread quite evenly in the hydropower serving region. So the power provision benefits
are not included in this paper, since it mainly targets on the unevenly distributed benefits
from dams.
Water supply is another important function for dams, including water supply for irriga-
tion, industrial and household uses. Irrigational benefits can extend to nearby downstream
regions and nearby upstream regions following the canal system. Around 20% of the total
irrigational regions are irrigated by dams and reservoirs in China (Zhou, 1997). Most of the
main dam-irrigated cropped regions are in Yellow River and Yangtze River basins close to
the dam sites. Duflo and Pande (2007) and Hansen et al. (2009) reported positive impacts
on downstream agricultural yield from dam irrigation in India and US.
Flood control is also a main dam function, but mainly benefiting downstream regions.
10Hydropower electricity is generally cheaper than electricity generated from coal plants. So areas served
with hydropower electricity benefit from lower energy cost.
11Around 60% of large-scale dams are located in the western provinces, like Guizhou, Sichuan, Yunnan
and Guangxi.
12This is the region with most economic activities in China. Power shortage generally exists in this region.
13For example, Longtan Dam provides 30% of the electricity generated to the local grid system and 70%
to Eastern China, while the Three Gorges Dam provides all the electricity generated to Eastern China.
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By regulating water flow through dam storage and release, dams can reduce flooding risk of
the whole downstream regions in flooding seasons. Other benefits of dam projects include
navigation in the dam-site and upstream region, and tourism development in the local and
upstream region. By lifting water level in the reservoir, the vast water body can support
longer navigation route, reducing navigation risks.
Dams projects are also associated with negative impacts, including inundation, involuntary-
migration, water flow change and stricter water regulations. Due to water storage in the
reservoir, areas closely behind the dam are subject to inundations. People in dam-site coun-
ties suffer from involuntary migration and asset losses. There have been more than 10 million
people affected by involuntary resettlement caused by dams since 1950s. For Three Gorges
Dam specifically, around 1.4 million people migrated because of the dam impacts according
to official reports (Heming et al., 2001). Even though people are compensated fully or par-
tially for the assets losses and livelihood changes, social and non-monetary environmental
impacts are rarely compensated, such as damages to the social network and social capital
accumulation(Cernea, 2000).
Large-scale dam projects can also bring environmental, hydrological and social changes.
Hydrological cycle in the river basin will be disrupted, reflected from decreased water speed,
shrinking water flow and decreased sediment delivery in downstream regions. But whether
these impacts are benefits or damages for macro-economic performance, or for agriculture
specifically, is ambiguous, especially when environmental impacts occur simultaneously with
irrigation and inundation functions(Yang et al., 2008). Disease burden may increase due
to the change of landscapes caused by the inundation. The large reservoir surface in the
dam-site and upstream region may increase the spread of mosquito-borne infectious disease,
such as malaria (Chakravarty, 2011). There are also concerns about water pollution in the
upstream and dam-site areas due to the accumulated wastes behind the dam wall. Large-
scale dams may impact the spawning and growth of fisheries in the downstream regions, due
19
to changes in water flow, changes in water temperature and species migration disruption(Xie
et al., 2007).
Besides geographic heterogeneity on upstream, dam-site and local regions, dam impacts
also show temporal heterogeneity, since the dam construction periods range more than sev-
eral years. Dam construction and operation may cause different impacts. Dam construction
bring negative impacts such as displacement and inundation, and positive impacts such as
dam-related infrastructure construction and part of the dam functions. However, the main
benefits from dam functions happen in the dam operation periods, including power genera-
tion, irrigation, flood control, water supply, navigation, tourism and fishing. Dam operation
may bring negative impacts such as hydrological and fishery changes in the river. Some
impacts occur both in the construction and operation periods, including pollution control
and land conservation in upstream regions, social capital loss from involuntary migrations.
By analyzing dam impacts in two periods separately, the temporal heterogeneity will be
captured.
2.2.3 Intergovernmental Transfer in China
The current intergovernmental transfer system in China formed in 1994 under the Tax Shar-
ing Scheme (TSS), which shaped the vertical fiscal relationship between the central and local
governments. It empowers the central government to collect certain categories of taxes or
share several tax revenues with the local governments. The central government can make fis-
cal intergovernmental transfers to local governments for economic development and revenue
redistribution purposes. Transfers often take the forms of tax return, subsidy, general trans-
fer and special transfer for specific projects. Tax return is used to encourage investment in
certain region or certain industry, for example, special development zones. General transfer
is used to narrow down the gap between local expenditure and fiscal capacity. There are also
transfers targeting at specific projects on infrastructure investment, agriculture, science and
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technology development, education and subsidy transfers for poor regions, minority ethnic
regions, urban areas and natural disaster relief.
The magnitudes of transfers to a county differentiate for various types of transfers. Most
transfers follow implicit formulas, mostly based on the population needing the service, fiscal
deficits of local governments or ethnical composition. For instance, transfer for agriculture
and rural tax reform was distributed according to the reported number of rural people and
agricultural cropping areas. However, some other special transfers are more flexible, largely
depending on the local needs, instead of a constant pre-defined formula, such as transfers for
infrastructure construction and disaster relief. These transfers are more likely to be impacted
by the local governments’ project proposals, political bargaining power and historical transfer
magnitudes.
For dam projects specifically, related intergovernmental transfers include tax return, spe-
cial transfer for dam project construction, special transfer for reservoir protection, special
transfer for water source protection, special transfer for strategically important geographic
regions, special transfer for infrastructure construction besides dams, general transfer and
subsidies for fiscal deficits caused by involuntary migration, agricultural impacts or other
economic impacts. New dam projects may change the intergovernmental transfer amount
through multiple ways. First, general transfers may change due to dams revenue impacts and
population changes, since the formula for general transfers includes elements such as fiscal
deficit ratio, population size and population with special demands. Second, special transfers
may be impacted due to dam related economic activities, such as dam-related infrastruc-
ture construction, reservoir protection, upstream soil and land conservation, agricultural
irrigations and fisheries etc.
For local governments, total fiscal resources are composed by the internal tax revenue
and external transfers. Intergovernmental transfers reflect the fiscal redistribution from
upper-level governments. The transfer here are mainly governmental fiscal transfers to bal-
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ance fiscal capacity of local governments. Even though they play a role of attenuating the
revenue losses of local governments, private compensations made by dam companies 14 for
asset loss, resettlement and migrations are not included in the transfers. So the separation
of internal and external revenue sources makes it possible have a better understanding of
the governments’ decision making process on dams and to distinguish the direct economic
impacts and fiscal redistribution by local governments.
2.3 Theoretical Model
The following is a simple fiscal federalism model explaining governments’ decision process
for large infrastructures approved by the central government. The basic model setup is that
there are two local governments (1,2) under the governance of the same central government.
Each local government makes expenditures and provides public service to maximize social
utility in the administrative region under a fiscal budget constraint independently, while
the central government maximizes the weighted sum of utility in two localities. The main
model structure follows the basic model setup on intergovernmental transfers proposed by
Slack (1980) and Zou (2012). Local governments keep a vertical fiscal relationship with
the central government, i.e. central government collects a certain share of tax revenues
generated from the local governments and makes fiscal transfers down to local governments.
The optimization problem is a typical Stackelberg game, with equilibrium solved by backward
induction.
Assume that the decision on dam construction and dam impacts are exogenous for local
governments. The central government has the final approval authority, while local govern-
ments have limited bargaining power about the location and approval of the dam projects
14The direct compensation for asset loss and alternative livelihood is done by the dam construction com-
panies following the national compensation rule. This private compensations are included in the cost-benefit
analysis of the dam projects and borne by the dam companies.
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ex ante. Once the project is approved, the impacts will be exogenous for local governments
15.
The fiscal relationship between central and local governments follows the fiscal federalism
structure. The central government collects taxes from two localities to support its expen-
diture, and also makes intergovernmental transfers to localities for efficiency and equity
considerations. Localities share fiscal tax revenues with the central government following
the ratio of ρ: (1 − ρ), with local governments sharing ρ percent of total tax and central
government sharing the rest16. The intergovernmental transfers from central government to
local governments are reframed as the net transfer amount into local governments, because
empirically there are transfers in both directions between local and central governments.
The intergovernmental transfers are simplified to only one block transfer 17, which means
the transfer amount is independent of local expenditure behavior 18.
2.3.1 Assumptions
The main assumptions for the model are the following.
1. There is no borrowing or saving for local governments across time periods. This is a static
model for a one-shot game.
15Empirically, the decision on location and design of large-scale dam projects are mostly proposed by the
river basin committee and Ministry of Water Resources under the help of research institutes affiliated to
water resource department. Local county governments have little bargaining power on the location choices.
But they ex post can raise project or program proposals and apply for the intergovernmental transfers from
the central government.
16The tax sharing proportion is the same across the country. But different ratios may be applied for
different taxes. For instance, valued-added tax is shared at 75:25 by the central and local governments.
Income tax is shared at the ratio of 60:40.
17In reality, there are two types of intergovernmental transfers: block transfer and matching transfer. Block
transfer is the transfer independent of the local expenditure size and fields, while the matching transfer is
the transfer correlated with local expenditures.
18If the transfers are specified as block and matching transfers. The main analysis results do not change
much, because the matching factor for central governmental transfers are normally constant across regions.
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2. Government’s utility function meets Inana conditions, i.e. (1) U(0) = 0; (2) U ′ > 0 and
U ′′ < 0; (3) limx→+∞ U(x) = 0, limx→0 U(x) = +∞.
3. There are no horizontal transfers directly among local governments.
4. The decision of dam construction and economic impacts of dam projects are exogenous
to local governments.
Applying backward induction, the Subgame Nash Equilibrium (SGNE) can be solved
by solving local optimization problem first and central optimization problem second as the
following.
2.3.2 Local Government Optimization
Assuming two local governments make decisions simultaneously, i.e. one cannot observe
another’s action ex ante. Each government maximizes the utility of the presentative agent,
subject to a budget constraint in the administrative region.
max
gi
Ui(gi)(i = 1, 2)
s.t. gi ≤ ρtYi + fi
where Ui is the utility function of the representative individual as a function of public
service provided by local government (gi). The public service is assumed to be rival but
non-exclusive. So gi here is the per capita public service provided by the local government.
t is the average tax rate. ρtYi represents the total tax revenue generated by the locality, as
ρ being share held by the local government and t as the average tax rate. (1 − ρ)tYi is tax
revenue collected by central government that is from locality i. fi is the block transfer which
is independent to local expenditure amount gi. The expenditure or public service provided
by local government is constrained by the total fiscal revenue, which is the sum of local tax
revenue and transfer from the central government.
The utility is framed to be depending on public expenditure, because local governors can
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signal economic performance to upper-level governments for promotion or evaluation(Li and
Zhou, 2005). Tax rate is assumed to be constant here, because the whole country adopts the
same tax rate structure except special development zones or poor regions with preferential
tax rates. Most types of taxes apply an uniform tax rate, with exceptions for progressive
tax rates applied on income taxes.
Solving the above problem using Lagrangian approach, the optimal local investment of
locality i and j are:
g∗i = ρtYi + fi (2.1)
This is the static optimal result, meaning that local governments will spend out the available
fiscal resource to maximize the public service provision utility. If a dam project brings
local revenue impacts (∆Yi) and external redistribution impacts (∆fi), the change of local
expenditure will be ∆gi = ρt∆Yi + ∆fi.
2.3.3 Central Government Optimization
Once predicting the optimal decision of local governments, the central government maxi-




αU1(g∗1) + (1− α)U2(g∗2)
s.t. f1 + f2 ≤ (1− ρ)t(Y1 + Y2)
Here α represents the constant weight that central government puts on locality 1, and
1 − α is the weight on locality 2. In addition, the central government is restricted by the
budget constraint that total transfer should be no more than the tax revenue available to
the central government, which is (1 − ρ) share of total tax revenue. So (1 − ρ)t(Y1 + Y2) is
the tax revenue shared by the central government.
Substituting g∗1 and g∗2 using the local optimization solution of equation (1), the central
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government’s optimization problem can be solved using Lagrangian approach.




=αU ′gg∗1 ′ − λ = 0
∂L
∂f2
=(1− α)U ′gg∗2 ′ − λ = 0
∂L
∂λ
=(1− ρ)t(Y1 + Y2)− f1 − f2 = 0
If the utility function is assumed as U(g) = ln(g), the optimal transfer amount can be solved
as the following.
f ∗1 =αt(Y1 + Y2)− ρtY1
f ∗2 =(1− α)t(Y1 + Y2)− ρtY2
(2.2)
The optimal governmental expenditure or governmental service to be provided will be solved.
g∗1 =αt(Y1 + Y2)
g∗2 =(1− α)t(Y1 + Y2)
The result indicates that the optimal governmental public service is a share of the total tax
revenues from all localities. The share depends on the decision weight central government
putting on local regions. Assume that a dam project brings net benefit ∆Y to the country,
the model implies that both governments will a proportion of the benefits from the project.
However, the benefit proportions will be different for local governments depending on the
decision weight and total population.
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2.3.4 Propositions
Based on the above optimization results, we can derive three propositions related to the
governmental fiscal transfer decision.
Proposition 1: If local revenue decreases because of the infrastructure project, the transfer
will increase. If local revenue increases, the change in transfer is uncertain.
∆f ∗i |(Yi < 0) > 0
This proposition can be derived from Equation(2.2) of the optimal transfer results. This
proposition indicates that transfers can mitigate the negative revenue impacts.
Proposition 2: The change in governmental economic performance or public good provision
is equivalent to the sum of changes of local tax revenue and total received transfers.
∆g∗i = ρt∆Yi + ∆f ∗i
Proposition 3: The change in governmental fiscal resources is equivalent to the decision
weight α.
∆g∗i = αt(Y1 + Y2)
This proposition means that governmental economic performance can reveal information on
the relative decision weight of local governments. There have been a lot of researches studying
why the central government weigh local regions differently. The potential impacting factors
include population of local region, iinequality aversion of the central government(Behrman
and Craig, 1987), economic strength of local regions(Huang and Chen 2012 and Shih et al.),
electoral productivity and partisanship(Castells and Sole-Olle, 2005), other political influ-
ence factors such as seats in the Political Bureau (Huang and Chen, 2012), media (Besley
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and Burgess, 2002) and ethnical composition. However, this paper only reveal the relative
decision weights across different locations. The specific mechanisms why a certain region has
higher or lower weights will not be verified.
2.3.5 Graphic Interpretation
To interpret the results graphically, the change in local tax revenue and change in intergovern-
mental transfer of one region can be plotted on a Cartesian Plane as shown in Figure(2.12). If
we draw diagonal line passing original point O, it represents the original economic condition
without infrastructure projects. Local revenue impacts of dam projects will push the out-
come point away from the original point along the horizontal axis. The fiscal redistributive
impacts from intergovernmental transfers will push the point away from the horizontal axis.
The sum of horizontal and vertical values represents the change in governmental performance
(∆g) under the internal and external revenue impacts from an infrastructure. The grey area
below the diagonal line represents the worse-off outcomes, meaning that governmental per-
formance is worse than the outcome without dam projects. Area above the diagonal line is
the better-off zone for local governments.
If the dam project brings outcomes A and B as shown in Figure (2.12), it indicates that
the project decreases the governmental revenue of A and increases the transfer to A, while
increasing the governmental revenue of B and decreases the transfer to B. Combining the
revenue and redistribution results together, the project is Pareto improving since both A
and B are above the diagonal line. Proposition 3 from the theoretical model indicated that
the relative location of A and B from the diagonal line may imply the decision weight of
each local government, i.e α. The intercept of 45 degree line passing the point represents
the governmental performance of that local government. We can call these 45 degree lines
iso-wellbeing lines, because any point moving along the line generates the same governmental
utility. The further the iso-wellbeing line is away from the diagonal line, the better-off the
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local government will be, and the higher the decision weight will be for that government.
In the following section, I use empirical data to estimate revenue and redistribution
impacts of large dam projects on local governments in China. The estimates will be plotted
on the Cartesian Plane to determine whether the dam projects are governmental Pareto
improving or not.
2.4 Data and Summary Statistics
2.4.1 Dam and Hydrological data
Dam data was obtained from China Large Dam Management Committee(China ICOLD),
covering all dams above 100 meters finished or under construction by 2003. I manually
updated the dataset with newer dams based on China ICOLD report in 2008 and annual
hydropower reports after 2008(CHINCOLD, 2008). In all, there are 143 dams above 100
meters by 2010. The dataset includes dam characteristics such as the official construction
begin and finish year, dam location, reservoir volume, reservoir storage level, hydropower
capacity, dam designed purposes and dam height. Dams were manually georeferenced based
on the crosscheck of registered administrative location and Google Earth image location.
The following analysis focuses on 136 Dams in mainland China19.
The river stream network and basin information are from USGS Hydro1K dataset, which
records detailed information on river streams, including stream length, river gradient, dis-
tance to the water head and distance to the water end. Each stream within the dataset is
coded by a 6-digit Pfafstetter number, from which the related upstream and downstream
streams can be identified20. Due to the limitation of Pfafstetter basin coding that it can
19The rest 7 dams are in Taiwan.
20Each region was codes from large numbers to small numbers following the river flow direction, with odd
number representing the interbasin or stem river, and even number representing the sub-stream river. The
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only divide a basin into 9 sub basins in maximum, Pfafstetter basins might be inconsistent
with empirically reported river basins. So I matched the Pfafstetter basin with real basin
division to define the boundaries of basins. There are 25 major basins in China. A lot of the
dams are located in Yangtze and Yellow river basins.
2.4.2 Economic Data
The economic and demographic data were reported by National Bureau of Statistics in the
Annual County Statistics Yearbook. The annual reports cover 2086 counties from 1996 to
2010, with information in economic, social and demographic perspectives. Main variables
include GDP, population, consumption price index, total governmental revenue and total
governmental expenditure. Population here refers to the reported population registered
in the local county based on the Hukou system in China. So population changes mainly
capture changes involving Hukou changes, such as project-induced migrations, job-related
migrations, births and deaths in the local region. Typical migrant workers, as rural labor
force working in the urban areas, will not be included in the population of their working
location, because most of migrant workers still keep their original household registration.
Besides the above economic data, I also use local fiscal information, which were reported
by Ministry of Finance annually on China County-Level Fiscal Statistic Report. Fiscal data
are available from 1994 to 2006. It covers detailed categories of governmental fiscal activities,
including local fiscal revenue, fiscal expenditure, and intergovernmental transfer from central
government to local government, and transfer from local government to central government.
I use net intergovernmental transfer, i.e. the transfer from central to local government minus
the transfer from local to central government to represent the net transfer flow from central
government to local governments.
specific method to trace the upstream and downstream regions can be found at Furnans & Olivera (2001).
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Real economic and fiscal data are calculated at the price level in 2000, by adjusting
the nominal values by annual consumption price index of local counties. On average, the
population of a county is around 400,000. Mean GDP per person was around 12,000 CNY
(around 1,700 US dollars) in 2006 using the 2000 price level. Governmental revenue per
person was around 630 CNY and net intergovernmental transfer per person was around 930
CNY in 2006.
2.4.3 Agricultural Data
To explore dam impacts on agriculture production, I use the agricultural production data
provided by International Food Policy and Research Institute (IFPRI), covering agricultural
yields and cropping areas of three crops (rice, wheat and maize) at county level in China
from 1980 to 2000. Yields have increased significantly in the past several decades. The
average yield for rice is around 6 tons per hectare. I drop yield and area outliers with value
beyond three standard deviation from the annual average value for each county.
2.4.4 Weather Data
Because the operation and function of dams are closely linked to the weather condition
in the basin or local region, In order to control other types of weather disasters, I also
collect temperature and precipitation data from 1980 to 2010, with temperature records
from CRU(Climate Research Unit in University of East Angolia) database and precipitation
records from National Centers for Environmental Prediction, NOAA(National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration). Annual average temperature and precipitation at county
level were derived from monthly temperature records at the 0.5*0.5 grid level and monthly
precipitation observations at the 2.5*2.5 grid level. The drought index was built based on the
deviation of annual precipitation from historical average precipitation. A year was defined




I use difference-in-difference approach to estimate the dam impacts, by comparing control
and treatment counties before and after the dam construction. Ordinary least square (OLS)
estimates will be biased because dam location may be impacted by local economic perfor-
mance. The central government may distribute dam projects to a rich or poor region for
promoting economic development and reducing inequality among regions. Many researchers
used the instrument variable (IV) approach to estimate the causal effect of dam projects on
different outcome variables, with river gradient as an instrument for geographic variations
of dam locations (Duflo and Pande 2007, Strobl and Strobl 2011, Chakravarty 2011, Hansen
et al. 2009, Lipscomb et al. 2011). A possible concern about the IV approach is exclusion
restriction violation. River gradient can impact economic performance through other ways
besides dam locations. For example, empirical data indicated that river gradient may impact
highway and railway construction, since river gradient might be correlated with land steep-
ness. Table(2.13) indicated that both railway and highway constructions are most frequent
for environments with medium gradient, which is similar for dam projects(Duflo and Pande
2007).
2.5.1 Difference-in-Difference Approach
I define the control and treatment county groups based on the geographic variations of dam
impacts from variations on distance to river and distance to the dam. Control and treatment
counties are separately defined in upstream, dam-site and downstream regions. Most of the
positive and negative impacts from dam projects rely on the natural water flow directly,
such as flood control, irrigational water supply, power generation, navigation and tourism,
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dam-induced migration and water use restrictions. So regions closer to the river are exposed
to more impacts comparing to regions further away.
Treatment counties are defined as counties with geographic centroids located within the
20km neighborhood 21near the dammed-river. Control counties are defined as counties lo-
cated next to the treated counties but further away from the river. So the control and treat
counties have similar geographic topography such as slope and elevation, weather, ethnical
composition, provincial governance, except the only difference in distances to river. Control
counties are defined slightly differently in upstream and downstream regions. Because down-
stream counties are normally flatter and smaller in size than upstream counties in China,
upstream control counties are defined in a broader scale than downstream control coun-
ties. Upstream and dam-site control counties are counties with centroids located more than
20km but within 100km neighborhood of the river. Downstream control counties are these
with centroids located between 20 and 50km away from the river. In addition, based on
the inundation and dam construction records of each dam, counties directly involved in the
land inundation and displacement records were marked as treatment counties. In this way,
each dam has its corresponding upstream control, dam-site control, downstream control and
treatment groups.
Besides defining the comparable control and treatment counties, the temporal periods
area divided into three categories, before dam construction, during dam construction and
after dam being constructed. “Before" periods are defined as two years before the official
dam construction begin year, because there are preparatory construction22 and anticipatory
21The average width/length of the county polygons is around 40km. This means that counties with river
pass through will most likely be included in the treatment group. Counties close enough to the river, even
with the river not directly passing through, will be also included in the treatment group, because they bear
impacts from the dams, like water supply by canal network, and dam-related construction activities.
22Regulations in China requires that large-scale infrastructures should finish “San Tong Yi Ping" (access
to water, electricity, road and land leveling) before the official construction.
33
economic activities before the official dam construction year. “During" periods are defined
as one year before construction and years with actual construction work. “After" periods are
defined as years after the official dam construction finish year.
The dam treatment is defined as the dam impacts from the nearest large-scale dam
project. Since a county can be subject to the impacts of multiple dams, here I assume the
nearest dam matters most for the economic condition of a region. Each treatment county is
linked to the nearest dam based on distance between the county and dams along the river.
The control counties can be used as multiple controls for different dams. The validity of
nearest dam assumption here will be verified using the second closest dam as a sensitivity
test in the following analysis.
The main assumption for DID estimation is that control and treatment counties should
follow the same trend before dam construction, so that the growth in control and treatment
counties would be the same if dams were never built. Table(2.3) plots the trend difference of
treatment and control counties in upstream, dam-site and downstream regions. It indicates
that treatment and control counties in three regions follow similar trends for most variables
before dam construction periods. The smaller pre-trend of dam-site treatment counties on
net transfers and the larger pre-trend of upstream treatment counties on precipitation may
imply that the DID estimates might be downward biased. The larger pre-trend of upstream
treatment counties on transfer is not robust on weather control.
In addition to the homogenous pretrend assumption, there are concerns about the un-
certainty of DID estimators from panel data with long time series. Because the treatment
status changes very little in the long time series and the dependent variable will be highly
serial correlated, the standard error of estimates will be underestimated using typical DID
approaches. A potential solution to the problem is to ignore the time series information
and collapse data into two periods, before and after the treatment. The regression estimates
based on the collapsed data will be unbiased (Bertrand et al. 2004, Donald and Lang 2007).
34
In the result reporting part, I report both the simple DID estimates and DID estimates using
collapsed data.
2.5.2 Empirical Approach
In the following section, I use two specifications to estimate the average impacts of dam
projects and the temporal heterogeneity of dam impacts for each location group separately.
The regression specification for estimating average impacts of dam impacts is:
yidpt = β0 + β1(Upi ∗ Tid ∗ P1idt) + β2(Upi ∗ Tid ∗ P2idt) + β3(Vicinityi ∗ Tid ∗ P1idt)
+ β4(Vicinityi ∗ Tid ∗ P2idt) + β5(Tid ∗ P1idt) + β6(Tid ∗ P2idt) + γMidt + δXit
+ ρt + λi + ζpt+ idt (2.3)
where Tid is a dummy variable indicating whether i is a treatment or control county for
dam d. P1idt and P2idt are dummy variables showing whether county i in year t is in the
dam construction or operation periods of dam d. Upi and Vicinityi are dummy variables
indicating whether i is in the upstream or dam-site region of dam d, the default group is
set as “downstream”. Midt are the interactions between location and treatment status, and
interactions between location and dam periods. βˆ5 and βˆ6 are the estimates for average
treatment effect(ATE) for downstream counties. βˆ1 + βˆ5 and βˆ2 + βˆ6 are the ATE estimates
for upstream counties. βˆ3 + βˆ5 and βˆ4 + βˆ6 are the ATE estimates for dam-site counties. The
above specification provides similar results as DID estimates for each location separately.
Xit are temperature and precipitation controls for i in province p in year t. The regression
includes county fixed effect (λi), year fixed effect (ρt) and provincial trend (ζpt) to capture the
impacts of geographic endowment, annual variation and different provincial growth trends on
outcome variables. Errors are clustered at dam level to correct correlations among counties
linked to the same dam in the same basin, considering that dam operation impacts counties
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in the basin coherently and the dam construction decision involves basin level integrated
planning.
Besides the static estimates of dam effects in the dam construction and operation period,
I also estimate the temporal variation of dam effects at different years, using the following




βttreati ∗Dyearit + δXit + ρt + λi + ζpt+ idt (2.4)
where Dyear is the normalized year relevant to the official dam construction year. The
regression included 25 years, ranging from 8 years before dam construction to 16 years after
the official dam construction year. The default group is set at 2 years before the official
dam construction year. The regression includes year fixed effect, county fixed effects and
provincial trend. The errors are clustered at dam level.
2.6 Results
The following section reports the estimates of average dam impacts on governmental revenue,
net transfer, economic and agricultural outcomes in upstream, dam-site and downstream
regions. The spatial and temporal heterogeneity are also explored. One thing to be noticed
is that here Iï¿œm only estimating the impacts of large-scale dams on upstream, dam-
site and downstream administrative regions, instead of the actual geographic upstream and
downstream regions, considering that a local administrative region may spread across the
geographic upstream and downstream areas simultaneously.
2.6.1 Governmental Revenue
Table(2.4) provides the DID estimates for local governmental revenue impacts of large-scale
dams from Equation (2.3), with logarithm of per capita governmental revenue as the de-
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pendent variable. The first column reports governmental revenue impact estimates using all
county samples. The “treat*during” coefficient captures dam construction impacts, and the
“treat*after” coefficient captures dam operation impacts. The estimate for upstream con-
struction effect is the linear combination of β1 + β5. Similarly. the estimates for upstream
operation and dam-site regions are also linear combination results. Column (1) indicates
that upstream counties suffer a 16.5% decrease in governmental revenue during operation
periods and an 7.5% decrease insignificantly during dam construction periods. Dam-site
counties benefit in both dam construction and dam operation periods. But the magnitude
of dam operation benefit is much larger than that of dam construction benefit, with revenue
increasing by almost 20% in the operation periods. This is consistent with the previous evi-
dence that local counties benefit from increased economic activities in the dam construction
periods and increased tax revenue from electricity sell from hydropower generation. Nev-
ertheless, downstream counties show insignificant and negative coefficients in both periods,
implying slight economic worse-off results. There are worries that the results might be driven
by specific county group, specific dams and provinces. The rest of the table reports various
of sensitivity checks. Column (2) reports the results using counties located within 1000km
away from the day. Coefficients are almost the same as the full sample results. Column
(3) reports the results by dropping top invested dams with investment larger than 20 Bil-
lion CNY. It shows that the uneven revenue impacts are not dominated by heavily invested
large-scale infrastructure projects. Due to the geographic conditions for dam projects, dams
tend to be concentrated in several provinces, such as Sichuan, Hubei and Guizhou. To verify
that the estimates are not driven by the changes of governmental revenue in these provinces,
Column (4) reports the results by dropping the top 4 provinces with most counties connected
to dams. Column (5) is an additional sensitivity check on the estimates by dropping weather
controls. It indicates that the main results remain robust. To correct the serial correlation
concerns caused by a few treatment status in the long times series, Column (6) reports the
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results using Duflo and Pande (2007) data collapsing approach, to collapse all periods into
three time points (before, during and after) for each county. It shows that the revenue im-
pact estimates for dam-site regions remain robust, while the upstream revenue effects are
not significant.
Dam impacts on local governmental revenue show great geographic heterogeneities. Fig-
ure(2.5) shows estimates in different distance bins in upstream, dam-site and downstream
regions. The closer a county is to a dam, the larger the impacts are. Most of the nega-
tive revenue impacts occur in upstream counties located within 200km away from the dam,
which is the same for both dam construction and dam operation, with revenue decreased by
more than 20%. This region is also the area exposed to direct inundation, migration, social
structure disruption and water quality regulations.
In addition to the different impacts from dam construction and dam operation, temporal
heterogeneity of dam impacts are analyzed following regression Equation(2.4). Considering
that counties within 200km away from the nearest dams are exposed to the largest impacts,
Figure(2.6) plots out the annual estimates for dam impacts on governmental revenue in
upstream, dam-site. downstream and all three regions, with upstream and downstream
counties located within 200km away from the nearest dam. Because there are quite few
treatment status changes in a given year, there might be serial correlation concerns for the
annual estimates. The negative impacts of upstream region are not quite significant. For the
dam-site regions, the positive impacts on governmental revenue begin from the 1 year before
the official dam begin year and becoming larger gradually. The largest revenue effect is
observed 7-8 years after the dam construction, which is also the beginning period of full dam
operation, considering that a dam takes 6-7 years to be built on average. If the analysis is
done in all three regions, there are no significant dam impacts on the governmental revenue.
but the direction of the estimates are positive.
Both the geographic and temporal heterogeneities of dam impacts imply that dam op-
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eration causes much larger uneven impacts than dam construction in both upstream and
dam-site regions. This is different from the usual arguments about negative dam impacts in
the construction periods on upstream regions. There are several potential reasons. One is
that actual inundation only begins a few years before the full operation time, even though
population migration may occur in the whole construction periods. Dam construction itself
doesn’t change the hydrological cycle to upstream regions much, because the river will be
diverted to an alternative path. The revenue base in upstream will not be impacted much
during most of the construction periods. Another reason might be that dam construction
has a lag effect on the governmental revenue, considering that the economic, social and envi-
ronment disruption may take time to be reflected into economic performances. Even though
the migrants are compensated directly for the damages they suffer, the social impacts or
other indirect social costs are not compensated.
2.6.2 Intergovernmental Transfer
The second set of results is on the external revenue source of local governments, net intergov-
ernmental transfers. Table (2.5) reports the estimates for changes in per capita net transfer
due to dam projects. The general structure is the same as that for governmental revenue.
Column (1) reports the estimates using the whole sample. Column (2)-(5) report the esti-
mates using nearby county samples, non-heavily-invested dams, provinces less concentrated
with dams, and regression without weather controls. Upstream and dam-site regions receive
higher transfers from dam projects. The net transfer into upstream counties increases by
13.6% from construction and less from dam operation. Dam construction and operation
increases net transfer into dam-site counties by more than 16.6%. For both the upstream
and dam-site transfer effects, dam construction brings a larger transfer effect than operation.
This is different from the temporal pattern of local governmental revenue impact, which is
larger in dam operation periods. The net transfer to downstream regions shows insignificant
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deceases in both the operation and construction periods. The results are robust for counties
located within 1000km away from the nearest dam, dams with less fixed investment and
provinces less concentrated with dams. So dams with large investment bring almost the
same transfer increase to dam-site counties, implying that transfers are not fully for dam
investments. The transfer increases are not restricted to dam-concentrated provinces.
The transfer impacts also show geographic heterogeneities, as plotted in Figure(2.7).
Upstream counties located closer to the dam have an increase in net transfers, especially
counties located within 200km away from the nearest dam. For counties located further
away in the upstream, the positive transfer effects are smaller. Transfers into downstream
counties within 200km away from the day decrease slightly, even though the decrease is not
statistically significant. Figure(2.8) plots the temporal heterogeneities of transfer impacts for
upstream and downstream counties located within 200km away from the dam, since counties
in this distance are subject to larger impacts on transfers. The top-left graph of temporal
heterogeneities of dam impacts in the upstream shows similar pattern as the construction
and operation estimations. Transfers increase significantly from the official construction
year and 6 years after the official construction year. Then the transfer increases become
much smaller after 7 years. The top-right graph in Figure(2.8) shows that the transfer into
dam-site counties increase slightly but not statistically significant, potentially due to linear
correlation among year dummies or the lower pre-trend in treatment counties before the
dam construction period. Table(2.3) shows that treatment counties in the dam-site region
have a smaller growth rate than dam-site control counties. However, the above estimates
result reveal that dam bring a positive transfer effect to dam-site regions. So the negative
pre-trend difference in the dam-site region works favoring my estimation. Net transfer in
downstream regions are not significantly impacted.
The geographic heterogeneity of dam impacts in different distance bins on governmental
revenue and intergovernmental transfer implies that governmental transfers change in the
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opposite direction of governmental revenues in upstream and downstream regions, verifying
the first proposition in the theoretical model. Even though there is no explicit regulations or
policies regulating that the net transfers are used to compensate the governmental revenues
in the upstream regions, the opposite movement of external net governmental transfer and
internal governmental revenues indicates that intergovernmental transfers redistribute some
of the uneven impacts of large-scale dams in different regions and balance the revenue sources
of local county governments. However, the temporal pattern of transfer impacts in two dam
periods are not coherent to the temporal pattern of revenue impacts. Dam construction
brings larger transfer effects and smaller revenue effects than dam operation.
2.6.3 Economic Production GDP
Table (2.6) lists the regression results for dam impacts on logarithm of per capita GDP. It
indicates that dam projects reduce per capita GDP in the upstream counties with a small
decrease during the dam construction period and 6.5% decrease in dam operation period.
Downstream regions also experience small decreases in logarithm of per capita GDP. Dam-
site regions experience increase in per capita GDP, by around 3% in both dam construction
and operation periods. If the county samples are restricted to upstream and downstream
counties located within 1000 km away from the nearest dam, as shown in column (2), the
negative impacts of downstream regions are not statistically significant any more while the
operation negative impacts on upstream counties remain significant at 90% confidence level.
Column (3) and column(4) show that the different GDP impacts in upstream, dam-site and
downstream regions are not dominated by dams with large investment costs and provinces
concentrated with dams. The consistent negative impacts from dam operation reinsure that
there might be lagging social impacts caused by the migration and other social costs due to
water use restriction to the upstream regions besides the immediate economic impacts from
dam-driven migration. Using data collapsing approach to deal with the serial correlation
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concerns of county GDP, column (6) shows that the estimates for dam-site regions remain
robust, while the estimates for upstream regions switch direction, potentially because of the
smaller observations in upstream regions reflecting from the larger magnitude of estimates
and large standard errors.
The distributive impacts of dam projects on logarithm per capita GDP also shows ge-
ographic heterogeneities, as reported in Figure (2.11). Counties located within 200km up-
stream of the dam suffer from larger GDP losses in the operation period, while counties
farther away in the upstream are barely impacted. The impacts of dam projects on down-
stream regions are more complex. Downstream counties closely nearby (within 200km away
from the dam site)benefit from an increase in per capita GDP, while downstream counties
farther away (more than 200km) suffer from a drop in per capita GDP. This pattern is con-
sistent with Chakravarty (2011) findings for dam impacts on child mortality for downstream
benefits for nearby regions and losses for far downstream counties. Potential reasons for
the different impacts to downstream regions are that nearby downstream counties benefit
from water supply and irrigation, while further downstream regions may suffer from reduced
water because of the water storage in the upstream. Figure(2.10) plots the temporal het-
erogeneities of GDP impacts of upstream and downstream counties located within 200km
away from the nearest dam. The top-left subplot shows similar patterns as Table (2.6). Dam
construction brings much larger GDP loss than dam construction.
In 2003, China changed the GDP calculation methods from production/expenditure ac-
counting to a combination of census and production/expenditure accounting. The adjust-
ment was believed to enhance the accounting for small-scale industries and enterprises. Sub-
sample analysis for periods before and after 2003 in Table (2.6) show estimates with similar
directions with average estimates.
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2.6.4 Pareto Improvement Analysis
According to proposition 2 of the theoretical model, the sum of governmental revenue and
intergovernmental transfers represent the overall governmental economic performance. Dif-
ferent from GDP and income as the macroeconomic performance variables, the combination
of governmental revenue and transfers emphasizes the governmental performance and the
separation of internal and external sources of total fiscal revenue. In the governor promotion
social contexts of China, governmental performance can be a strong motivation for gover-
nors to make investment decisions and signal their performances. In the following section,
I will compare the governmental performance and overall economic performances for Pareto
efficiency analysis.
Figure (2.13) and Figure (2.14) plot the estimated changes of local governmental rev-
enue and intergovernmental transfers caused by large-scale dams in upstream, dam-site and
downstream regions. Because the above regression specification use logarithm values as the
dependent variables, the estimates are interpreted as percentages changes. Multiplying the
estimates with mean values of the control counties before dam construction, we can get the
value changes of each outcome variables using control counties before dam construction as
the benchmark value. Both figures also plot the 95% confidence interval of the value changes.
Figure (2.13) shows that upstream and dam-site counties benefit from dam construction
in the perspective of governmental fiscal capacity, while dam construction barely impacts
downstream counties. dam-site counties benefit from a 23 CNY increase in local revenue and
52 CNY increase in received transfers per person. Upstream counties suffer from revenue
loss amounting around 10 CNY, but receive an increase of transfer amounting around 50
CNY. Figure (2.14) shows that dam-site counties consistently benefit from dam operation.
Upstream and downstream counties are close to the diagonal line, with governmental per-
formance similar to the no-dam performance. For upstream counties in the dam operation
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period, governmental revenue decrease by 22 CNY per person, while the transfer increase in
a smaller magnitude than that of dam construction period, at around 25 CNY per person
just compensating the revenue loss. So dam projects are generally Pareto improving for dif-
ferent regions. No region get statistically worse off in governmental economic performance.
Considering that counties located within 200km away from the dam are subject to the largest
impacts, the outcomes for these counties are plotted in Figure (2.15) and Figure (2.16). Both
figures imply that nearby counties show similar pattern as that of the whole sample.
The macroeconomic variable GDP result shows similar patterns for dam-site benefits.
But upstream and downstream regions suffer from decreases in GDP, even though the ef-
fects are not statistically significant, except dam operation for upstream counties. Since total
GDP is composed by economic performance of private sector, governmental sector and inter-
national trade sector, the difference between overall economic performance and governmental
performance results reveals that private sector in the upstream region get slightly worse-off
from dam construction. The negative impacts on private sector are not redistributed well
through market mechanisms.
Applying proposition 3 of the theoretical model, the Pareto efficiency analysis results
indicate that the central government put a higher decision weight on dam-site counties in
the utility function for public service provision in face of dam projects. Upstream and
downstream regions are barely considered, with the decision weights of both regions close
to zero, except upstream counties in the dam construction period. In the whole process of
dam construction and dam operation, dam-site counties are highly weighed by the central
government. While upstream counties are only weighted in a small magnitude in the dam
construction period, potentially due to the attention on migration, inundation and social
structure disruption. But the weight becomes much smaller in the dam operation period,
even though the negative revenue and GDP impacts are much larger.
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2.6.5 Demographic and Agricultural Yields
Involuntary migration and agricultural impacts of dam projects have been widely studied as
potential mechanisms leading to economic losses and benefits. Table(2.7) reports the dam
impacts on level value of population, logarithm of population, average yield and planting
areas of rice.
Total population are not significantly impacted by large-scale dam projects, even though
upstream counties show a decrease in total population level value. However, the estimates on
logarithm population in upstream counties show opposite direction with that of level values,
potentially caused by the fact that dams cause migrations to population in a specific area
instead of a proportion of the total population of the county. This results is consistent with
involuntary migration in upstream regions. For most counties, dam normally inundates part
of the administrative county. The migration policy prioritize local migration to external
migration. However, the impacts on per capita governmental revenue reported in the above
tables imply that the total upstream revenue decreases considering that population also
decreases. The losses might be due to damage to social structure and social capital in the
region.
Even though irrigational dam projects was believed to increase the downstream agri-
cultural production significantly in India and Africa (Duflo and Pande 2007, Strobl and
Strobl 2011), the analysis on agricultural impacts of hydropower dams in China indicates
that upstream counties benefit from an insignificant increase in rice yield, while downstream
counties suffer from rice yield drop, with a 5.4% decrease in dam construction period and
7.6% in dam operation period. The main downstream regions suffering from rice yield drop
are counties located more than 200km away from the dam site, which is consistent to the
negative GDP impacts in these regions. Rice planting areas show similar patterns as rice
yields. The decrease of rice yield and area in the downstream regions corresponds to the
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reduced GDP and revenue found previously in downstream regions. One potential reason is
the reduced water flow because of water storage in the upstream areas.
2.6.6 Dam Functions
As mentioned in the background section, dams with different designed functions operate
differently. Hydropower dams store water in dry season to fill the reservoir and release water
prior the flooding season to save space for flooding water storage. However, irrigational
dams need to release water in dry season to downstream region and other agricultural service
regions to provide irrigational water. There have been studies found that irrigational dams
reduce weather variability in downstream significantly (Hansen et al. 2009, Duflo and Pande
2007). In the following section, I separately analyze the revenue and transfer impacts of
hydropower and irrigational dams.
Table (2.8) lists the estimates for governmental revenue and transfer separately from
two types of dams. An dam is classified as a hydropower or irrigational dam as long as
hydropower generation or irrigation is listed as one of the main functions. From the gov-
ernmental revenue results in column 2 and 3, hydropower dams contribute to more revenue
than irrigational dams in dam-site counties, but also bringing more revenue loss to upstream
counties. Hydropower dams increase revenue in dam-site counties by 17.2% in the opera-
tion period, while irrigational dams almost bring no significant revenue contribution to local
dam-site counties. The result verifies that the revenue benefits in dam-site counties are
mainly from electricity generation. The differences on revenue impacts are not because of
the size or height of dams, because there are no significant differences between the heights
of two types of dams, considering that most dams includes both functions as the designed
purposes. From intergovernmental transfer results in column 4 and 5, dam functions do not
have big impacts on the transfers to local dam-site counties. But upstream counties receive
more transfers from hydropower dams than irrigational dams.
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2.6.7 Falsification Tests
To verify that the main results I obtained are not because of factors correlated with the way
I define the treatment and control groups, or factors correlated with the way to link treat
counties to the nearest dam, I run two falsification tests. The first falsification test is to test
the validity of dam treatment. I randomly assign treatment status to counties following the
proportion of treatment and control counties in the analysis, keeping the linkage of counties
and dams as they are. The governmental revenue estimates from this falsification test is
reported in column (2) in Panel A of Table (2.10). The estimates for upstream and dam-site
counties in both the dam construction and dam operation periods are not significant. The
magnitudes of the coefficients are also quite different from the original DID results as in
column (1). The intergovernmental transfer outcome from this falsification is reported in
column (2) in Panel B of Table (2.10). None of the estimates for upstream and local regions
are significant. This convinces us that the original definition of treat and control groups is
crucial for the estimate results.
The second falsification test is to test the temporal dependence of the estimate results.
Here I randomly assign the dam construction year to each dam, maintaining the dam con-
struction length and linkage between counties and dams. The dam construction begin year
is assumed to follow a truncated normal distribution between 1980 and 2010, with the mean
and standard deviation the same as the original begin year. So the dam construction pe-
riod will still be the same length, but with different construction begin year and finish year.
This falsification test can verify how strong the result relies on the correct identification of
dam construction and dam operation period. The result was listed in column(3) of Table
(2.10) for governmental revenue and intergovernmental transfers. The estimates for local
and upstream counties are not significant any more for both the governmental revenues and
net intergovernmental transfer. However, the pattern of stronger dam operation effects than
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dam construction effects is observed in this falsification test, because the dam construction
and dam operation in the falsification test follow similar orders as the original.
The comparison between the original results and results from two falsification tests indi-
cates that correctly specifying the treatment and control status and dam construction begin
year is crucial to estimate the distributive and redistributive impacts of dam projects. The
estimates on revenue and transfer impacts are not caused by other variations beyond the
treatment status and different periods.
Because there are concerns about using the nearest dam only to estimate the dam impacts
on counties, I checked the impacts of second-layer dams, i.e. the second closest dam to a
county to see how excluding the second layer or farther dams impacts the dam estimates. The
results are listed in Table (2.11). The second layer dams do not impact the net governmental
transfer significantly in the upstream and downstream regions. However, the second closest
dam still decreases governmental revenue in the dam operation periods to upstream regions
significantly. This may imply that the actual economic impacts of counties from dam projects
may be underestimated using only the nearest dam.
2.6.8 Discussion
The impact estimates are different from the results obtained by Duflo and Pande (2007)
and Strobl and Strobl (2011), where they found positive agricultural benefits to downstream
regions from irrigational dams in India and Africa. One potential reason is that the opera-
tion scheme of hydropower dams differs from that of irrigational dams, which was illustrated
from the comparison of hydropower and irrigational dams in the previous section. For hy-
dropower dams, the primary purpose is power generation, which requires storing water in
the dry autumn season and releasing water for water generation. While for irrigational
dams, the primary purpose is to provide irrigational water use to the downstream regions,
which requires the dam to release water in the dry season. The water storage in dry season
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for hydropower dams may severe the drought condition in downstream regions, while the
irrigation services of irrigational dams can relieve the drought condition in downstream re-
gions. Another possible reason is that the outcome variables are different. I mainly analyze
the impacts on governmental revenue and GDP, which include other non-agricultural im-
pacts, such as construction work, tourism and other economic impacts beyond agriculture.
Even though dam projects may decrease agricultural production due to water seepage or
inundation, they also bring a lot of other economic activities, such as road construction,
infrastructure improvement and increasing job opportunities.
2.7 Conclusions
Governments globally encourage infrastructure investment to promote economic develop-
ment. However, a lot of the infrastructure projects may bring unevenly distributed impacts
to different locations, with large-scale dams as one example. Dam projects have been con-
troversial for the benefits on power generation, flood control and irrigation, and damages
from environmental and social impacts of inundation and hydrological change. The benefits
and damages are distributed geographically unevenly among different regions, depending on
the location along a river. Are the negative impact caused by dam projects mitigated by
the market and governmental mechanisms? Are the dam projects Pareto improving? This
paper answers these questions in China, since more than half of the large-scale dam projects
are located in China. The central decision making process of dam projects in China also
makes it meaningful to answer these questions for policy perspectives.
Using variations of dam impacts from the distances to the dam and distances to the
river, this paper adopts DID approach to estimate the dam impacts on fiscal, economic
and agricultural outcomes. The governmental economic performance is evaluated for Pareto
efficiency analysis, by separating the external and internal revenue sources of local county
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governments. Overall, large-dam projects are Pareto improving in the perspective of gov-
ernmental economic performance, with no region getting significantly worse off. dam-site
dam-site counties capture most of the economic benefits. Revenue losses in the upstream
counties are mitigated by intergovernmental transfers, even though the transfer amounts are
different in dam construction and operation periods.
Dam projects increase per capita governmental revenue to dam-site dam-site counties,
with an average 13% increase during dam construction period and 20% increase during dam
operation period from a dam above 100 meters. Upstream counties suffer a 16.5% decrease
in per capita governmental revenue during dam operation period, while downstream counties
are not significantly impacted, potentially due to the confronting impacts from flood control
benefits and reduced water flow. Generally, dam operation brings larger distributive impacts
than dam construction. The external intergovernmental transfers mitigate the negative
revenue impacts sufficiently. Upstream counties receive an increase in transfers, with a
13.6% increase during dam construction period and a 6.7% increase during dam operation
period. dam-site dam-site counties also receive more transfers, with an increase by more than
16% in both periods. Transfers to the downstream regions were not significantly observed.
Unlike the large tax revenue impacts in dam operation periods, the redistributive transfers
show a larger response to dam projects in dam construction period. The above results are
not driven by top invested dams and big provinces. The main results are robust even when
correcting the serial correlation concerns caused by too few treatment status in DID analysis
with long time series.
Dam impact estimates show geographic and temporal heterogeneities, depending on the
distance of a county to the dam. Counties which are located within 200km away from the
dam-site are impacts more significantly than these further away. This confirms that the
economic impacts on economic and fiscal performances in counties are associated with dam
functions of power generation and reservoir storage. For other outcome variables beyonds
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governmental economic indicators, the estimates on logarithm population are not significant,
potentially because the migration policy in China prioritize local resettlement. Rice yields in
downstream regions are negatively impacted, potentially due to reduced water flow. Counies
further downstream suffer a larger rice yield loss. These results are not consistent with the
downstream agricultural benefits from irrigational dams observed by Duflo and Pande (2007)
and Strobl and Strobl (2011). The reason may be due to the different design functions of
dams. Hydropower dams tend to generate a larger uneven impacts across different regions,
because of their special operation scheme to store water in the dry season.
By combining the fiscal distributive and redistributive impacts of dam projects, this
paper provides an empirical approach to analyze the Pareto efficiency in the perspective
of governmental economic performances in China. Even though estimates for GDP per
capita also shows similar directions as the combination results of revenue and redistributive
transfer outcomes, the separation of internal and external revenue sources provide a clearer
view of the governmental redistributive mechanism in face of uneven impacts. It can shed
some light on the policy implications on hydropower dam investment and intergovernmental
redistribution decision making in China.
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Tables and Figures
Table 2.1: Dam Construction History in China
(≥100m) Large Dams(≥30m)
Year N new dams per year N new dams per year
1973 21 1644
1988 42 1.31 3768 132.75
2005 129 4.83 4839 59.5
2008 142 3.25 5191 88
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Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics of Upstream Areas in the Pre-dam Construction Period
Up Dam-site Down
Variable Unit Control Treat Diff Control Treat Diff Control Treat Diff
pop 10000 43.7 33.8 -10.0*** 42.7 38.7 -4.03 53.9 55.7 1.8
GDP Yuan/person 2909 3645 736* 3655 3566 -89.12 4312 5135 823***
GDP growth rate % 0.1 0.1 -0.02+ 0.1 0.1 -0.004 0.1 0.1 -0.006
yield(rice) t/ha 5.2 5.1 -0.07 5.2 5.2 -0.03 5.6 5.7 0.078+
yield(wheat) t/ha 2.1 2.2 0.05 2.0 2.1 0.10* 2.3 2.6 0.29***
yield(maize) t/ha 3.3 3.2 -0.04 3.1 3.2 0.001 3.3 3.4 0.10*
rice area ratio % 0.4 0.3 -0.006 0.4 0.4 -0.025+ 0.5 0.5 -0.02**
temp C degree 11.0 8.7 -2.31*** 13.4 12.4 -1.03*** 13.8 13.2 -0.57***
precip mm/day 2.5 2.5 -0.06* 3.1 3.0 -0.14*** 3.3 3.0 -0.23***
pc tax revenue Yuan/person 131 201 70** 181 173 -8.04 163 189 26***
pc gov expenditure Yuan/person 691 786 95 575 491 -84.31* 335 381 46*
pc transfer Yuan/person 368 524 156*** 281 249 -32 202 176 -26
lnpcgdp 7.8 7.9 0.09* 8.0 8.0 0.01 8.2 8.3 0.1***
lnpop 3.3 2.6 -0.71*** 3.5 3.4 -0.09 3.7 3.8 0.05
lnpcgov revenue 4.7 4.8 0.17** 4.8 4.9 0.11 4.9 5.0 0.11**
lnpc transfer 5.3 5.7 0.4*** 5.3 5.2 -0.1 4.8 4.7 -0.069
slope 0.01 Degree 362 424 62* 482 547 65 252 230 -23
dem m 1479 1873 393.8** 1294 1420 125 535 507 -28
river flow 604 2693 2089** 1579 2763 1185 1124 7229 6104***
Notes: Diff is the difference between outcomes in the treatment and control counties. + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01,
*** p < 0.001
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Table 2.3: Homogenous Trend Test Before Dam Construction
Upstream Dam-site Downstream
pop -0.01 0.11 -0.19
GDP -31.92 21.03 8.17
GDP growth rate 0.011 -0.001 0.004
yield(rice) 0.001 -0.003 -0.005
yield(wheat) -0.01 0.01 0.006
yield(maize) -0.01 -0.02 -0.005
area(rice) -28.57 -72.84+ 49.07
area(wheat) -20.58 -18.99 -95.05**
area(maize) 8.06 -35.27 -99.36
rice area ratio -0.0003 0.00008 0.001+
temperature -0.005 -0.002 0.003
precipitation 0.007* 0.002 0.00008
gov revenue -4.76 3.13 2.88
gov expenditure 58.41 -5.19 -5.90
transfer 82.29+ -13.14* -0.23
Notes: Economic variables of GDP, governmental revenue, governmental expenditure, trans-
fer are in per capita terms. Coefficients are β estimates from yipt = βtreati ∗ yeart + αp ∗
yeart + γi + ρt + ipt for all upstream, dam-site and downstream regions separately two years
before the official dam construction begin year. Standard errors were clustered at dam level.
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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Table 2.4: Impact of Dams on Governmental Revenue
Dependent Variable: Log per capita Governmental Revenue
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
drop top drop top
DID ≤1000km invested dams 4 provinces collapse
UP*treat*during -0.075 0.006 -0.032 -0.164 -0.074 0.007
(0.078) (0.111) (0.078) (0.109) (0.078) (0.099)
UP*treat*after -0.165+ -0.127 -0.093 -0.249* -0.165+ 0.039
(0.089) (0.122) (0.093) (0.118) (0.089) (0.133)
Dam-site*treat*during 0.129+ 0.128+ 0.137+ 0.160* 0.129+ 0.174*
(0.074) (0.075) (0.078) (0.077) (0.075) (0.084)
Dam-site*treat*after 0.199* 0.194* 0.218* 0.260* 0.199* 0.200+
(0.084) (0.085) (0.087) (0.098) (0.084) (0.111)
DOWN*treat*during -0.044 -0.025 -0.047 -0.045 -0.044 -0.055
(0.036) (0.050) (0.032) (0.049) (0.037) (0.068)
DOWN*treat*after -0.069 -0.031 -0.047 -0.129* -0.070 -0.120
(0.060) (0.073) (0.065) (0.063) (0.060) (0.127)
N 13863 11526 10556 8912 13863 2245
Weather Controls Y Y Y Y N -
CFE Y Y Y Y Y Y
YFE Y Y Y Y Y -
Trend province province province province province -
Error Clustering Dam Dam Dam Dam Dam Dam
Notes: The coefficients of upstream and dam-site regions are the linear combination results from regressions with
downstream set as the default group. Column (2) reports estimates for counties located within 1,000 km away from the
dam.Column (3) reports the estimates dropping dams with investment larger than 20 Billion CNY. Column (4) reports
estimates dropping the top 4 provinces (Sichuan, Hubei, Guizhou, Shaanxi) with counties linked to dams. Column (5)
reports the estimates without weather controls. Column (6) reports estimates from collapsed data following BDM(2004)
approach. Weather controls include annual average precipitation and temperature. All regressions include county fixed
effects and year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at dam level in parentheses. + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01,
*** p < 0.001.
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Table 2.5: Impact of Dams on Intergovernmental Transfers
Dependent Variable: Log per capita Net Transfer
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
drop top drop top
DID ≤1000km invested dams 4 provinces collapse
UP*treat*during 0.136** 0.124* 0.126+ 0.159* 0.125* 0.338
(0.051) (0.057) (0.073) (0.068) (0.051) (0.248)
UP*treat*after 0.067 0.095 -0.076 0.0002 0.058 0.373
(0.093) (0.098) (0.072) (0.080) (0.094) (0.244)
Dam-site*treat*during 0.185** 0.180** 0.199** 0.200*** 0.183** 0.153
(0.059) (0.058) (0.065) (0.057) (0.059) (0.107)
Dam-site*treat*after 0.166+ 0.165+ 0.158 0.164+ 0.167+ 0.166
(0.092) (0.090) (0.098) (0.095) (0.094) (0.148)
DOWN*treat*during 0.007 -0.023 0.022 0.006 0.008 0.032
(0.054) (0.059) (0.051) (0.069) (0.053) (0.084)
DOWN*treat*after 0.007 -0.027 0.071 -0.037 0.010 0.211
(0.072) (0.080) (0.069) (0.073) (0.071) (0.177)
N 9688 8067 7468 6158 9688 1947
Weather Controls Y Y Y Y N -
CFE Y Y Y Y Y Y
YFE Y Y Y Y Y -
Province Trend province province province province province -
Error Clustering Dam Dam Dam Dam Dam Dam
Notes: The coefficients of upstream and dam-site regions are the linear combination results from regressions with
downstream set as the default group. Column (2) reports estimates for counties located within 1,000 km away from the
dam.Column (3) reports the estimates dropping dams with investment larger than 20 Billion CNY. Column (4) reports
estimates dropping the top 4 provinces (Sichuan, Hubei, Guizhou, Shaanxi) with counties linked to dams. Column (5)
reports the estimates without weather controls. Column (6) reports estimates from collapsed data following BDM(2004)
approach. Weather controls include annual average precipitation and temperature. All regressions include county fixed
effects and year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at dam level in parentheses. + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01,
*** p < 0.001.
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Table 2.6: Impact of Dams on GDP
Dependent Variable: Log per capita GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
drop top drop top
DID ≤1000km invested dams 4 provinces before 2003 after 2003 collapse
UP*treat*during -0.035 -0.023 -0.032 -0.015 -0.039 -0.024 -0.042 0.192+
(0.027) (0.032) (0.035) (0.035) (0.028) (0.024) (0.028) (0.106)
UP*treat*after -0.065* -0.077+ -0.047 -0.042 -0.069* -0.042 -0.008 0.226*
(0.032) (0.039) (0.042) (0.039) (0.032) (0.032) (0.043) (0.095)
LOCAL*treat*during 0.038 0.039 0.042 0.039 0.037 0.005 0.103+ 0.053
(0.046) (0.046) (0.049) (0.042) (0.046) (0.032) (0.058) (0.052)
LOCAL*treat*after 0.033 0.035 0.035 0.077 0.033 0.019 0.109+ 0.044
(0.054) (0.055) (0.056) (0.060) (0.054) (0.034) (0.065) (0.069)
DOWN*treat*during -0.040+ -0.011 -0.042+ -0.030 -0.041+ -0.029+ -0.018 -0.033
(0.022) (0.032) (0.021) (0.032) (0.022) (0.015) (0.024) (0.045)
DOWN*treat*after -0.068** -0.037 -0.066* -0.051 -0.068** -0.036 -0.058* 0.033
(0.025) (0.034) (0.028) (0.033) (0.025) (0.026) (0.028) (0.069)
N 12319 10234 9380 7937 12319 5743 5108 2124
Weather Controls Y Y Y Y N Y Y -
CFE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
YFE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y -
Trend province province province province province province province -
Error Clustering Dam Dam Dam Dam Dam Dam Dam Dam
Notes: The coefficients of upstream and dam-site regions are the linear combination results from regressions with
downstream set as the default group. Column (2) reports estimates for counties located within 1,000 km away from the
dam.Column (3) reports the estimates dropping dams with investment larger than 20 Billion CNY. Column (4) reports
estimates dropping the top 4 provinces (Sichuan, Hubei, Guizhou, Shaanxi) with counties linked to dams. Column
(5) reports the estimates without weather controls. Column (6) reports estimates before the 2000 GDP classification
adjustment. Column (7) reports estimates after 2000 GDP classification adjustment. Column (8) reports estimates from
collapsed data following BDM(2004) approach. Weather controls include annual average precipitation and temperature.
All regressions include county fixed effects and year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at dam level in parentheses.
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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Table 2.7: Impacts of Dams on Demographic and Agricultural Variables
pop lnpop yield rice area rice
Dam Construction(during)
Upstream -1.173+ 0.012 0.027 0.023
(0.671) (0.012) (0.038) (0.123)
Dam-site 2.370 0.028 -0.014 -0.051
(2.684) (0.028) (0.034) (0.070)
Downstream 0.026 -0.003 -0.054** -0.136
(0.540) (0.011) (0.020) (0.097)
Dam Operation(after)
Upstream -1.286 0.003 0.055 0.125
(0.797) (0.012) (0.044) (0.143)
Dam-site 2.144 0.022 -0.021 -0.048
(2.689) (0.028) (0.038) (0.093)
Downstream -0.405 -0.008 -0.076*** -0.118
(0.862) (0.018) (0.018) (0.078)
N 13931 13931 13833 13539
Notes: Each column is a separate regression for the dependent variable. Upstream and dam-
site coefficients are the linear combination from the regression with downstream set as the
default location group. All regressions include precipitation and temperature controls, year
fixed effects, county fixed effects and provincial trend. Standard errors clustered at dam
level in parentheses. + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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Table 2.8: Impacts of Dams With Different Design Functions
Gov. Revenue Transfer
Hydropower Irrigation Hydropower Irrigation
UP*treat*during -0.132 0.024 0.129* 0.068
(0.094) (0.081) (0.057) (0.063)
UP*treat*after -0.235* -0.111 0.057 0.003
(0.095) (0.086) (0.095) (0.124)
Dam-site*treat*during 0.095 0.027 0.176** 0.193
(0.076) (0.132) (0.060) (0.115)
Dam-site*treat*after 0.173+ 0.039 0.163+ 0.163
(0.087) (0.159) (0.093) (0.161)
DOWN*treat*during -0.020 -0.005 -0.031 0.015
(0.039) (0.057) (0.056) (0.054)
DOWN*treat*after -0.038 0.002 -0.027 0.017
(0.062) (0.088) (0.074) (0.084)
N 12096 8229 8473 5673
Weather Controls Y Y Y Y
CFE Y Y Y Y
YFE Y Y Y Y
Province Trend province province province province
Error Clustering Dam Dam Dam Dam
Notes: Each column is a separate regression for the dependent variable using subsample
counties which are linked to dams with one function or another. Hydropower dams are
dams with hydropower generation listed as one of the functions. Irrigation dams are dams
with irrigation listed as one of the functions. Upstream and dam-site coefficients are the
linear combination from the regression with downstream set as the default location group.
All regressions include precipitation and temperature controls, year fixed effects, county
fixed effects and provincial trend. Standard errors clustered at dam level in parentheses. +
p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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Table 2.9: Impacts of Dams of River Flow
(1) (2)














Notes: Hydropower dams are dams with hydropower generation listed as one of the functions.
Irrigation dams are dams with irrigation listed as one of the functions. Upstream and dam-
site coefficients are the linear combination from the regression with downstream set as the
default location group. All regressions include precipitation and temperature controls, year
fixed effects, county fixed effects and provincial trend. Standard errors clustered at dam
level in parentheses. + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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Table 2.10: Falsification Test of the DID results
(1) (2) (3)
original randomize randomize
treatment county dam begin-year
Panel A: Log per capita Governmental Revenue
UP*treat*during -0.075 0.039 -0.107**
(0.078) (0.059) (0.033)
UP*treat*after -0.165+ -0.001 -0.180*
(0.089) (0.064) (0.087)
Dam-site*treat*during 0.129+ -0.014 0.060
(0.074) (0.101) (0.075)
Dam-site*treat*after 0.199* -0.087 0.133
(0.084) (0.099) (0.092)
DOWN*treat*during -0.044 0.023 -0.005
(0.036) (0.029) (0.046)
DOWN*treat*after -0.069 0.024 -0.078
(0.060) (0.043) (0.058)
N 13863 13863 13863
Panel B: Log per capita Net Transfers
UP*treat*during 0.136** -0.180*** 0.018
(0.051) (0.047) (0.066)
UP*treat*after 0.067 -0.046 0.109
(0.093) (0.068) (0.090)
Dam-site*treat*during 0.185** 0.012 0.063
(0.059) (0.068) (0.090)
Dam-site*treat*after 0.166+ 0.093 0.105
(0.092) (0.100) (0.108)
DOWN*treat*during 0.007 -0.036 -0.025
(0.054) (0.062) (0.069)
DOWN*treat*after 0.007 -0.066 0.017
(0.072) (0.074) (0.092)
N 9688 9688 9688
Notes: Each column is a separate regression for the dependent variable. Upstream and dam-
site coefficients are the linear combination from the regression with downstream set as the
default location group. Column (1) reports the original results. Column (2) reports the coef-
ficients when the treatment status of each county were randomly assigned at probability 0.5.
Column (3) reports the coefficients when the official dam construction year were randomly
assigned following a truncated normal distribution, with the mean, standard deviation, lower
and upper bounds set at the original level. All regressions include precipitation and temper-
ature controls, year fixed effects, county fixed effects and provincial trend. Standard errors
clustered at dam level in parentheses. + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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Table 2.11: Impacts of Second Nearest Dams
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GDP Gov. Rev Net Transfer Population
UP*treat*during 0.024 0.150 -0.067 -0.018*
(0.036) (0.102) (0.042) (0.006)
UP*treat*after -0.067* -0.143+ -0.068 -0.018*
(0.030) (0.076) (0.108) (0.006)
DOWN*treat*during -0.017 0.074 -0.079 -0.003
(0.031) (0.080) (0.047) (0.010)
DOWN*treat*after -0.058 -0.027 0.057 -0.014
(0.034) (0.087) (0.084) (0.022)
N 8440 9530 6753 9563
Weather Controls Y Y Y Y
CFE Y Y Y Y
YFE Y Y Y Y
Province Trend Y Y Y Y
Notes: The outcome variables are logarithm per capita GDP, logarithm per capita govern-
mental revenue, logarithm per capita net transfer and logarithm population in each column.
Here counties are matched to the second nearest dam. Downstream counties are included
as default group in the regression. The coefficients reported here are the linear combination
results for the specific location with downstream region. All regressions include precipitation
and temperature controls, year fixed effects, county fixed effects and provincial trend. Stan-
dard errors clustered at river basin level in parentheses. Upstream and downstream samples
here were restricted to these located within 1000 km away from the dam. + p < 0.1, *
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
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Table 2.12: River Gradient With Railway and Highway Length
(1) (2) (4) (3)
lnrail railway lnhighway highway
grad (0-1.5%) 0.00149** 0.000416* 0.00173+ 0.0113+
(0.000530) (0.000156) (0.000909) (0.00591)
grad(1.5− 3%) 0.0138 -0.000523 0.0495** 0.499***
(0.0116) (0.00288) (0.0153) (0.120)
grad(3− 6%) 0.0806*** 0.0156*** 0.0227 -0.235
(0.0187) (0.00397) (0.0229) (0.174)
grad( > 6%) -0.0480* -0.0133* -0.249*** -2.345***
(0.0229) (0.00634) (0.0198) (0.152)
constant -1.855*** 0.187*** 1.873*** 9.542***
(0.203) (0.0373) (0.270) (1.782)
N 31 31 31 31
F 10.91 10.40 416.2 161.0
Notes: The outcome variables are logarithm and level value of railway and highway lengths
for each column. Each gradient category explanatory is the percentage of land in that
category. The analysis was done for provinces of China in 2010. + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, **
p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
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Table 2.13: Spatial Patterns for Residuals
(1) (2) (3)
lnpcgdp lnpcgov rev lnpcnet transfer
Upstream -0.0106 -0.0135 0.00312
(0.0111) (0.0228) (0.0183)
Local -0.000101 -0.0417 0.0343
(0.0130) (0.0268) (0.0213)
lon -0.00158 0.00218 -0.00413**
(0.000832) (0.00171) (0.00136)
lat -0.00228* -0.000670 -0.00262
(0.000970) (0.00200) (0.00159)
N 952 952 922
F 2.500 1.417 10.25
dfm 6 6 6
dfr 945 945 915
Notes: The outcome variables are residuals in 2000 from regressions in the first columns of
table 2.4 to table 2.6 for three different dependent variables. Similar results are got using
residuals in other years. + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
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Figure 2.1: Map of Dams Above 100 meters in China Finished or Under Construction by 2010
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Figure 2.2: Map of Identified Treatment and Control Counties
Notes: The orange polygons are treatment counties. The blue polygons are control counties.
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Figure 2.3: Illustration of Treatment and Control County Identification
Notes: This figure illustrates how the treatment and control counties are identified using Dam 104 (Xiangjia Ba Dam)
as an example. Black dots are control counties. Red dots are treatment counties. Treatment counties are defined as
counties with centroids located within 20km away from the river. Upstream control counties are defined as counties with
centroids located between 20 and 100km away from the river. Downstream control counties are those with centroids
located between 20 and 50km away from the river.
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Figure 2.4: Distribution for All Dams (with construction starting from 1996) Above 30
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Figure 2.5: Estimates for Dam Impacts at Various Distance Bins for Governmental Revenue
Notes: The dependent variable is logarithm of per capita governmental revenue. The graph
plots out the DID estimates and the 95% confidence interval for governmental revenue at
each distance bin. The bins in the left of the “dam-site” regions are upstream counties, while
bins in the right of the “dam-site” regions are downstream areas. The top plot reports the
estimation results in dam construction periods. The bottom plot reports the estimation re-
sults in dam operation periods. The regression model in each distance bin includes provincial
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Figure 2.6: Dam Estimates Over Time for Governmental Revenue
Notes: The dependent variable is logarithm of per capita governmental revenue. The graph
plots out β estimates and the 95% confidence interval from the regression equation of yipt =∑
t=−9...16 βttreati ∗Dyearit + δXipt +ρt +λi + ζpt+ ipt. Dyear is the normalized year relevant
to official dam begin year. In the clockwise direction from the up-left graph, each graph
is a separate regression showing the pattern for Upstream, dam-site, The whole Basin and
Downstream. Two years before the official dam begin year were used as the default group.
Upstream and downstream samples here were restricted to these located within 200 km away
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Figure 2.7: Estimates for Dam Impacts at Various Distance Bins for Net Transfer
Notes: The dependent variable is logarithm of per capita net intergovernmental transfers.
The graph plots out the DID estimates and the 95% confidence interval for governmental
revenue at each distance bin. The bins in the left of the “dam-site” regions are upstream
counties, while bins in the right of the “dam-site” regions are downstream areas. The top
plot reports the estimation results in dam construction periods. The bottom plot reports
the estimation results in dam operation periods. The regression model in each distance bin
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Figure 2.8: Dam Estimates Over Time for Intergovernmental Transfers
Notes: The dependent variable is logarithm of per capita net intergovernmental transfer. The
graph plots out β estimates and the 95% confidence interval from the regression equation of
yipt =
∑
t=−9...16 βttreati ∗Dyearit + δXipt + ρt + λi + ζpt+ ipt. Dyear is the normalized year
relevant to official dam begin year. In the clockwise direction from the up-left graph, each
graph is a separate regression showing the pattern for Upstream, dam-site, The whole Basin
and Downstream. Two years before the official dam begin year were used as the default
group. Upstream and downstream samples here were restricted to these located within 200
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Figure 2.9: Estimates for Dam Impacts at Various Distance Bins for GDP
Notes: The dependent variable is logarithm of per capita GDP. The graph plots out the
DID estimates and the 95% confidence interval for governmental revenue at each distance
bin. The bins in the left of the “dam-site” regions are upstream counties, while bins in the
right of the “dam-site” regions are downstream areas. The top plot reports the estimation
results in dam construction periods. The bottom plot reports the estimation results in dam
operation periods. The regression model in each distance bin includes provincial year trend,
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Figure 2.10: Dam Estimates Over Time for GDP
Notes: The dependent variable is logarithm of per capita GDP. The graph plots out
β estimates and the 95% confidence interval from the regression equation of yipt =∑
t=−9...16 βttreati ∗Dyearit + δXipt +ρt +λi + ζpt+ ipt. Dyear is the normalized year relevant
to official dam begin year. In the clockwise direction from the up-left graph, each graph
is a separate regression showing the pattern for Upstream, dam-site, The whole Basin and
Downstream. Two years before the official dam begin year were used as the default group.
Upstream and downstream samples here were restricted to these located within 200 km away
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Figure 2.11: Estimates for Dam Impacts at Various Distance Bins for Rice Yield
Notes: The dependent variable is logarithm of rice yield. The graph plots out the DID
estimates and the 95% confidence interval for governmental revenue at each distance bin.
The bins in the left of the “dam-site” regions are upstream counties, while bins in the right of
the “dam-site” regions are downstream areas. The top plot reports the estimation results in
dam construction periods. The bottom plot reports the estimation results in dam operation
periods. The regression model in each distance bin includes provincial year trend, year fixed
effects and county fixed effects, with error clustered at dam level.
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ρt∆Yi + ∆f ∗iNo Pareto Improvement
Pareto Improvement
Notes: The comprehensive impacts of dams can push the outcome points away from the
original point O to any points in the four quadrants, depending on the combination of
changes in governmental revenue and changes in intergovernmental transfer. Points below
the diagonal line passing through Quadrant II and Quadrant IV are worse-off outcomes.
Above the diagonal line, the farther away a point is from the diagonal line, the better
off it will be. The relative distance to the diagonal line represents the wellbeing of local
governmental performance. The distance also represents the relative weight of a region in
the central decision making process for fiscal resource distribution.
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Notes: This figure plots the estimated dam construction impacts on governmental revenue
and net transfer for counties at three locations. The value change in revenue and transfer are
calculated by multiplying the estimates with the mean value of outcome variables for control
counties before dam construction. The horizontal axis represents the changes in governmental
revenue, while the vertical axis represents the changes in governmental transfer. The crosses
at each point represent the 95% interval for both estimates. The further away the point is
from the diagonal axis, the better off a county is.
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Notes: This figure plots the estimated dam operation impacts on governmental revenue and
net transfer for counties at three locations. The horizontal axis represents the changes in
governmental revenue, while the vertical axis represents the changes in governmental transfer.
The crosses at each point represent the 95% interval for both estimates. The further away
the point is from the diagonal axis, the better off a county is.
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Notes: This figure plots the estimated dam construction impacts on governmental revenue
and net transfer for counties within 200km away from the dam site, based on the estimated
results from logarithm outcome variables and the mean values of dam-treated counties in
the three locations. The horizontal axis represents the percentage changes in governmental
revenue, while the vertical axis represents the percentage changes in governmental transfer.
The crosses at each point represent the 95% interval for both variables. The farther away
the point is from the diagonal axis, the better off a county is.
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Notes: This figure plots the estimated dam operation impacts on governmental revenue and
net transfer for counties within 200km away from the dam site, based on the estimated
results from logarithm outcome variables and the mean values of dam-treated counties in
the three locations. The horizontal axis represents the percentage changes in governmental
revenue, while the vertical axis represents the percentage changes in governmental transfer.
The crosses at each point represent the 95% interval for both variables. The farther away
the point is from the diagonal axis, the better off a county is.
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Chapter 3
Transfer for Disasters: Governmental Respon-
siveness to Typhoon Risks in China
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Abstract
Natural disasters bring significant economic damages globally. Governmental-initiated dis-
aster reliefs, especially disaster relief transfers from the central government to local regions,
play an important role of reducing damage and help economic recovery for local regions.
We use typhoon disaster in China as an example to analyze the responsiveness of central
government for local disaster exposures and potential factors impacting central government’s
transfer efforts. By exploiting both geographic and year-to-year variations of typhoon expo-
sure at the county level, we find that the central government responds to the current year
typhoon exposure by increasing targeting transfers to local regions. Transfer efforts seem
to be driven by local vulnerability, instead of political connection and governmental efficiency.
3.1 Introduction
About 75% of global population live in areas exposed to at least one type of natural disasters,
like flood, drought, earthquake and typhoon etc (UNDP, 2012). These natural disasters
bring significant asset loss, economic damage and death to vulnerable areas (Barro, 2006;
Barro, 2009). Governmental-initiated disaster relief plays a key role to reduce physical
and economic damages and help disaster recovery. Besides local disaster relief efforts, the
central or federal government regularly provides disaster relief aid to local regions through the
intergovernmental transfer system. This fiscal structure provides a risk sharing mechanism
among multiple levels of governments. However, the capacity of local regions to attract
central transfers may vary, depending on local vulnerability, geographic importance and
other factors (Cole et al., 2012; Albouy, 2012).
Most of studies on transfer across jurisdictions so far are about international aid transfers.
International disaster relief aids are driven not only by local needs and vulnerability, but
also by news coverage, governmental efficiency, strategic importance of receiver country
and relative closeness between donor and receiver countries (Strömberg, 2007; Besley and
Burgess, 2002). The closeness includes geographic, cultural and historical closeness, such as
language similarity and colonial connection with the donor countries. Studies on transfers in
the domestic context are still limited. This paper aims to study intergovernmental transfer
responses to natural disasters using typhoon in China as a special case.
Typhoon, also called hurricane or tropical cyclones in other regions, make frequent land-
falls to east coastal China, bringing severe economic damages every year. The central govern-
ment arranges and delivers special transfers for disaster relief purposes to local governments,
following the hierarchical fiscal federalism structure including province, prefecture and local
county or city from top to bottom. Ever since the 1990s, China has been experiencing a
fiscal reform called “province manages counties", which aims to remove the prefecture level
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for fiscal transactions between the province and county governments. Total governmental
transfers for natural disaster relief purposes reached 8.64 billion CNY in 2011 (MCA, 2011).
To explore the transfer responsiveness to typhoon disasters, we first build a simple the-
oretical model about central government resource distribution to local governments. The
model shows that disaster relief transfer depends on both the vulnerability or economic im-
pacts of typhoon exposure and the decision weight or relative importance of local regions in
the central government decision making process. These two claims are verified by empirical
analysis, using a self-built dataset on typhoon exposure over all counties and cities in China
from 1980 to 2008. We apply both fixed-effects and first-difference estimation methods to
study the average transfer responsiveness to typhoon disasters and heterogeneities in the
responsiveness. There are concerns that typhoon exposure may be not completely exoge-
nous, and that it may be serially correlated or following certain unobserved climate patterns.
First-difference estimation can provide unbiased estimates for the average responsiveness by
using only the variation of differences of typhoon and outcome variables over time. We
generate four sets of results about the average governmental responsiveness, heterogeneity
of responsiveness, impacting factors for responsiveness and implications of the recent fiscal
reform on governmental responsiveness.
The first set of results is about the average responsiveness of all local regions in China.
Local macroeconomic performance measured by per capita GDP is not significantly damaged
by typhoon exposures. This confirms the ambiguous macroeconomic impacts of typhoon
disasters found in the Caribbean region (Hsiang, 2010). For intergovernmental transfers,
the central government increases special transfer with targeted purposes to local regions
for the current year typhoon exposure. On average, local regions receive 5% more special
transfers when the average maximum wind speed increases by 10m/s. However, general
transfers which are non-targeting transfers, barely change along with typhoon exposures.
We also find that there is a delay in the expenditure of local governments relative to disaster
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exposure. Local regions tend to increase expenditures targeting at social welfares, such as
social security, health expenditures one year after the typhoon disaster. This may imply
ex-post disaster preventive efforts or the bureaucracy of governmental decisions.
The second set of results is about heterogeneities of governmental responsiveness. Re-
sponding to typhoon exposure, the central government increases special transfers mainly to
poor regions and regions suffered from severe typhoons with high average maximum wind
speed. This confirms the theoretical claim that more transfers go to regions with larger
vulnerabilities.
The third set of results is about factors impacting central governmental responsiveness
to local typhoon exposures. We obtain the average changes of GDP and special transfer
to typhoon exposure for each local county and city separately. Regions experienced large
GDP losses or benefits tend to be inland areas. The macroeconomy in coastal regions
have adapted to frequent typhoon exposure very well. Special transfer responsiveness is
lower in regions hit by typhoon every year. This supports the adaption behavior in high
typhoon exposure regions found by Hsiang and Narita (2012). Special transfer responsiveness
is also higher in more populated regions. However, special transfer responsiveness is not
significantly associated with population density, ethnicity group composition and number of
peer competitor counties within the same prefecture.
The fourth set of the results is about whether the “province manages county" reform and
political connection impact special transfer responsiveness or not. Both the reform and con-
nection between provincial governors with the political bureau members bring insignificant
and positive impacts on the special transfer responsiveness. After the reform, local regions
don’t receive more special transfers for the disaster relief. This may corresponds to one of the
obstacles of the reform that the administrative structure didn’t reform simultaneously with
the fiscal system. Local regions are still subject to the administration of prefectural govern-
ments, such as performance evaluation, project approval, officer promotion and designation
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etc (Wang et al., 2011) .
One thing to note is that the estimate in this paper might be a lower bound of the actual
disaster transfer responsiveness, because disaster transfer is only a small part of total special
transfer which is analyzed in the paper. Here we assume that other terms of special transfer,
such as education, technology development and infrastructure transfers1, aren’t correlated
with the variation of typhoon exposures. To our knowledge, this is the first paper exploiting
intergovernmental transfer responsiveness to natural disasters. It contributes to the large
literature on disaster impacts, disaster relief and political economy of intergovernmental
transfers.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 shows the background of typhoon exposure
and intergovernmental fiscal structure in China. Section 3 builds an intergovernmental trans-
fer model to show how disaster transfer responsiveness be impacted by local vulnerability
and the importance weight of a region in the central decision process. Section 4 describes
the dataset and empirical specification. Section 5 shows the empirical analysis results on
average responsiveness and heterogenous responsiveness. Section 6 concludes.
3.2 Theoretical Model
To illustrate how the intergovernmental transfers respond to local typhoon risks, here is a
simple federalism model including local natural disaster shock. The framework of this model
is simplified from the intergovernmental transfer decision model by Zou (2012). Beyond that,
this model also extend the typical intergovernmental transfer model by including local dis-
aster shocks following similar structure as the model Persson and Tabellini (1996) developed
for cross country risk sharing models.
1Infrastructure transfers here are transfers for general infrastructure constructions. Disaster related in-
frastructure maintenance and investment are funded by disaster transfer under special transfers.
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Assume that there are two local governments i = 1 and i = 2 under the same central
government. Both regions face the the same typhoon risk h with probability of pi. However,
they suffer different losses L1(h) and L2(h). In the no-typhoon state at the probability of
1− pi, both regions have private good production level X1 and X2. The central government
makes transfers G1 and G2 ex post to both regions for disaster relief purposes, subject to the
budget constraint of G1 +G2 = W . Here W is the total available fiscal resource for disaster
relief in the central government. Here we assume W is constant2.
The central government faces the following optimization problem of maximizing the











s.t. G1 +G2 = W
Solving it using Lagrangian approach, we can get:
α1W
′
1(X1 − L1(h) +G1) = α2W ′2(X2 − L2(h) +W −G1) (3.1)
Assume W (x) = ln(x), the optimal transfer amount can be written as3:
G1∗ = α1
α1 + α2
(W − L2(h)) + α2
α1 + α2
L1(h) (3.2)
From the optimization results, it is intuitive to see that disaster relief into one region is
positively correlated with local economic loss L(h). Another finding is that the net change
2Considering that typhoon relief transfer is only a small part of the total intergovernmental transfer, it is
reasonable to assume that total typhoon relief transfer resource is exogenous to the local disaster exposures.





of economic production (Gi − Li) is proportional to the decision weight αi. So generally,
regions suffered more economic losses and regions with larger decision weight receive more
transfers from the central government.
3.3 Background
3.3.1 Typhoon Risks and Impacts
Around 1/3 of local counties, mostly in coastal regions area, are exposed to frequent typhoon
hits in China. Figure (3.2) plots the average maximum wind speed of typhoon exposure
across China. It shows that there are a lot of variations in the typhoon exposures across local
regions. Typhoons in China mostly form in Western North Pacific sea (Wang et al., 2007).
Then they gear power over water surface following the track. After they make landfalls, wind
speed and energy power will decrease along the way. The frequency of typhoon hits and vast
geographic regions in China provide a chance to study the variations of typhoon exposures in
lower administrative levels. According to the report of China Meteorological Administration,
on average there were 9 typhoon hits in China annually from 1951 to 2008(MCA, 2011). Most
of the typhoon events concentrate in the summer and early autumn season between June
and October.
Typhoon events bring heavy rainfall and winds. However, the damages of typhoon can
take multiple forms, such as heavy wind damaging infrastructure and crops, inundation
induced by heavy rains and storm surge in coastal regions due to the combination of rainfall
and wind push. The strength of typhoon exposure is normally measured by the maximum
1-minute sustained wind speed4. Even though wind-induced damages only contribute to part
of total damages, rainfall and storm surges are also partially correlated with wind speeds.
4NOAA (2005)
88
The association between rainfall and wind speeds may depend on local topographic and
landscape structure (Jiang et al., 2008).
The combination of wind, flooding and storm surge bring significant economic damages
and asset losses. Nordhaus (2010) studied economic impacts of hurricanes in coastal US and
concluded that economic damages as percentage of GDP rose at the ninth power of hurricane
wind speed. Other negative impacts confirmed in the empirical studies include slow down of
output growth (Strobl, 2012), significant physical and human capital losses (Anttila-Hughes
and Hsiang, 2013) and decrease in output of agricultural and tourism sectors5 (Hsiang, 2010;
Mohan and Strobl, 2013). For China specifically, total direct economic losses from typhoon
reached 629.2 billion CNY, amounting to 24.2 billion CNY per year from 1983 to 2008
(Fengjin and Ziniu, 2010). There has been an increasing trend in typhoon-induced economic
damages in the past decade in China.
The long-run and macroeconomic impacts of typhoon disasters are more complex (Mc-
Comb et al., 2011). Local regions may result into economic decline or recovery depending
greatly on the social, political and institutional factors, such as governmental efficiency, lit-
eracy, openness and media coverage etc (Toya and Skidmore, 2007; Noy, 2009; Eisensee and
Strömberg, 2007; Garrett and Sobel, 2003).
3.3.2 Disaster Relief Resources
Governmental-initiated disaster relief play an important role to reduce typhoon-induced
damages. Special fiscal resources for disaster relief purposes are arranged by governments,
targeting at both infrastructure maintenance, recovery and reconstruction and household
level special aids for food, housing and health services. The funding of local disaster relief
are mostly from special transfers from upper-level governments and special arranged disaster
5Hurricanes create output losses to agriculture industry, wholesale, restaurants and hotels industry and
mining and utilities industry, and bring output increases to construction industry.
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relief expenditure in local governments. Total governmental transfers for natural disaster
relief reached 8.64 billion CNY in 2011. Even though it is only a small proportion (2.8%) of
the total economic losses amounting to 309.6 billion CNY from all natural disasters(MCA,
2011), intergovernmental transfers are key for disaster relief in rural regions, where the
private insurance coverage is limited6.
Due to widespread typhoon risks, the central government needs to respond to disaster
relief in multiple local regions. The transfer aid decision process from central government
to local governments is still quite obscure. How large the transfer should be and where
the transfer should go not only depend on the local vulnerabilities and local needs, but
also on other social and political factors, such as governance efficiency, media coverage,
ethnical composition, importance of local regions and the connection between local and
central governments (Besley and Burgess, 2002; Cole et al., 2012; Albouy, 2012).
3.3.3 Intergovernmental Transfers in China
This section provides a more detailed look into the fiscal transfer system in China. There
are 4 fiscal jurisdiction levels with fiscal capacities of revenue collection and expenditure
spending, including the central government, province, prefecture and county. Most of the
central-local fiscal transferred went through this 4-layer transfer route: central-province-
prefecture-county/city. In 2003, provinces passed 70.8 % of total fiscal resource to prefec-
tures and prefectures passed 75.4% to county governments. China have been going through
the “province manage county" fiscal reform ever since 1990s, which aims to flatten the fiscal
hierarchical structure by removing prefecture inventions in fiscal activities between provinces
and counties. The reform was initially planned to be complete by 2012, with all counties in
6The current disaster-related insurance type is mainly typical asset loss insurance. So far there is no
special agricultural insurance for natural disasters in the whole nation. The asset insurance paid 112.97
billion CNY in 2005 for natural disasters (Wenhui, 2007), corresponding to the total economic losses of 252.8
billion CNY and 5.1 billion CNY disaster transfers (MCA, 2007).
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China under the direct fiscal governance of corresponding provinces (Qinghai, 2009). How-
ever, the goal wasn’t reached. It is generally believed that the reform has slowed down in
many local regions. One of the largest obstacles is that the reform is only targeting at the
fiscal relationship, instead of the administrative relationship. Even though local counties are
relatively independent from the prefectural governments for fiscal activities, they are still
under the administration of prefectural governments, which includes governance evaluation,
regional development plan, evaluation and promotion for local governors. Another concern is
that the relative independence of local counties in terms of fiscal activities may reduce spend-
ings on long-term public services like education while increasing more short-term “promotion
driven" expenditures such as infrastructure investments (Wang et al., 2011).
Intergovernmental transfers include two types of transfers: special and general transfers.
Special transfers are targeting transfers with usage specified by the central government. Ex-
amples of special transfers include infrastructure transfer, forest conservation transfer, land-
for-green transfer, disaster relief transfer and education transfer to poor regions. General
transfers used in this paper represents all other transfers except special transfers7. Gen-
eral transfers are non-targeting transfers that local governments have a lot of freedom to
decide the usage8. Examples of general transfers include ethnicity minority region transfer,
rural transfer and 9-year compulsory education transfer. Comparing to special transfers,
general transfers tend to follow explicit formulas, normally based on population, rural ratio,
ethnical composition and economic development level of regions. For example, there are
700 counties eligible for a special transfer to increase wage of civil servants. Agriculture
and rural tax reform transfers are distributed based on the reported number of rural people
7In the fiscal reports, there is a specific category called “general transfers". It is not equivalent to general
transfer used in this paper.
8For some general transfers, the usage was also restricted. For example, transfer to subsidize teacher
salaries in rural regions has the usage specified clearly, even though it is categorized under general transfers.
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and agricultural cropping areas. Special transfers are more subjective, depending on the
local projects proposals, policy or development plans for the central government. It is also
believed to be more subject to bargaining and political connection distortions (Huang and
Chen, 2012). Figure(3.3) plots the growth trend of governmental transfers in the past two
decades. Reliance on transfers for local governments has increased dramatically, with trans-
fers contributing to more than 60% of local revenue in 2010. The composition of transfers
also changed a lot. Local governments obtained more fiscal independence over the usage of
transfers. Ratio of special transfers with designated purposes has decreased to around 50%
in 20109.
Related to natural disasters, there is a “Natural Disaster Relief Fund" under the category
of special transfers. The general process for intergovernmental relief fund distribution fol-
lowed a path as “upward report and downward transfer". Once a disaster hit a local region,
the local government needs to report damages to the upper level government. Then each
upper-level government needs to report upwardly following the administrative hierarchy. Af-
ter the report reached the central government, expert committees will evaluate the severity
and decide whether to declare it “severe disaster" or not. Once a disaster is classified as a
severe disaster, the central government will arrange transfers based on damage evaluations
(MOF, 2011).
3.4 Data
This paper uses typhoon exposure, fiscal and economic data at county level from 1996 to
2008, with summary statistics reported in Table (4.1). More than 500 counties were excluded
because they were not exposed to any typhoon shock during this period. As a result, around
9This is the national trend. For analysis in this paper, we only focus on counties and county-level cities,
excluding a lot of prefectural cities. So the trend for counties and county-level cities is different.
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1600 counties or county-level cities are included in the analysis.
3.4.1 Typhoon Data
We initiatively built a dataset on typhoon exposure covering all counties and cities in China
by reconstructing the path and wind field for each West Pacific cyclones recorded in the Inter-
national Best Track Archive for Climate Stewardship (IBTrACS) using Limited Information
Cyclone Reconstruction and Integration for Climate and Economics (LICRICE) model 10.
After reconstruction for each cyclone separately, we can obtain two main indictors to de-
scribe the exposure of each cyclone: wind speed and energy dissipation index for each pixel
by interpolation. County-level typhoon exposures were calculated by using information of all
pixels within the geographic location. Annual indicators for typhoon exposures were derived
using the information of all typhoons passing through a certain location in that specific year.
This paper uses Average Maximum Wind Speed (maxs) to represent typhoon exposure for
each county from 1980 to 200811. One potential concern is that wind speed cannot account
for all of typhoon impacts, since it doesn’t take into complete consideration of storm surge
and flooding. The latter two impacts depend more on the combination of local topographic
condition and typhoon characteristics. So typhoon risks in the paper mainly refer to risks
associated with maximum wind speed.
Figure (3.2) plots the distribution of average typhoon exposure to local counties in China.
Coastal provinces, like Guangdong, Fujian and Zhejiang, are subject to larger typhoon risks
than inland regions. There is a clear gradual decrease for typhoon risks from the coastal to
inland areas as wind speed decrease after typhoon landfalls. Figure(3.1) plots the annual
10More detailed methodology of the wind field reconstruction can be found at Hsiang (2010)
11We also used Power Dissipation Density Index as typhoon measures and got estimates with similar
directions and significance. We only include results for wind speed results here for ease of result comparison
with other studies on typhoon studies (Nordhaus, 2010; Emanuel, 2005; Hsiang, 2010).
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variation of typhoon risks for all local regions exposed to typhoon risks from 1980 to 2008.
It shows that typhoon risks varied greatly from year to year. The largest exposure was
observed in 1994, when a series of typhoon hit China in August and September. The average
maximum wind speed across all regions with typhoon histories reached more than 13m/s12
in 1994. Comparing to typhoon exposure of other Asian regions, coastal regions in China
are considered to be high risky regions. The average maximum wind speed of Philippine
provinces between 1979 and 2008 was 16.9m/s(Anttila-Hughes and Hsiang, 2013), while the
average maximum wind speed of Japan between 1950 and 2008 was 3.39m/s (Hsiang and
Narita, 2012).
3.4.2 Fiscal and Economic Data
Annual local fiscal information was obtained from Ministry of Finance from 1996 to 2006
(MOF, 1994-2006). It covers detailed categories of governmental fiscal activities, including
local fiscal revenue and fiscal expenditure, and intergovernmental transfer from the central
government to local governments. However, we don’t have transfer data on natural disaster
relief specifically. The economic and demographic data were obtained from National Bureau
of Statistics in the County Statistics Yearbook from 1996 to 2010, covering 2086 counties and
county-level cities(NBS, 2006-2010). Main variables include GDP, population, consumption
price index, total governmental revenue and total governmental expenditure. Population
here refers to the reported population registered in the local county based on the Hukou
system in China. So population changes mainly capture changes involving Hukou changes,
such as project-induced migrations, job-related migrations, births and deaths in the local
region. Typical migrant workers, as rural labor force working in the urban areas, will not be
included in the population of their working location, because most of migrant workers still
121m/s=3.6km/h≈ 2.24mile/h
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keep their original household registration.
Real economic and fiscal data are calculated at the price level in 2000, by adjusting the
nominal values by annual consumption price index of local counties. Table (4.1) reports the
summary statistics of county-level fiscal data. The average special transfer was 127 Yuan
per capita during 1996 and 2006. The average population of local counties and county-level
cities was around 460,000. Mean GDP per person was around 12,000 Yuan (around 1,700
US dollars) in 2006 using the 2000 price level. Governmental revenue per person was around
630 Yuan and net intergovernmental transfer per person was around 930 Yuan in 2006.
3.4.3 Agricultural Data
To explore typhoon impacts on agriculture production, we use the agricultural production
data provided by International Food Policy and Research Institute (IFPRI), covering agri-
cultural yields and cropping areas of three crops (rice, wheat and maize) at county level in
China from 1980 to 2000. Rice yield increased significantly in the past several decades. The
average yield for rice is around 6 tons per hectare. I drop yield and area outliers with value
beyond three standard deviation from the annual average value for each county.
3.4.4 Weather Data
In order to control other types of weather disasters, we also collect temperature and precip-
itation data from 1980 to 2010, with temperature records from CRU(Climate Research Unit
in University of East Angolia) database and precipitation records from National Centers
for Environmental Prediction, NOAA(National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration).
Annual average temperature and precipitation at county level were derived from monthly




To empirically estimate governmental responsiveness to typhoon exposure, we exploit the
year-to-year and geographic variations of typhoon exposure, measured by average maximum
wind speed. Because typhoon exposure has strong geographic patterns, with certain regions
getting more frequent exposures than others, simple cross-section analysis on typhoon expo-
sure and transfer is not sufficient due to missing-variables, like geoeconomic importance and
regional transfer policies. We explore the year-to-year variation of typhoon exposure for each
location, by including county fixed effects, which can take into account of any regional fixed
factors, such as geographic location. Year fixed effects are included to control any annual
factors across the whole nation, such as big social and natural events like big earthquakes
and annual policies like the adjustment of transfer categories or terms in specific years.
The exogenous variations of typhoon strength and landfall location provide strong causal
implications on the relationship between governmental responsiveness and typhoon expo-
sure. It is generally agreed by scientists that the annual year-to-year prediction of typhoon
exposure to a specific local region is still quite difficult (Emanuel, 2005). Most of the current
typhoon predications are very short-term, like daily and weekly predictions. So for outcome
variables at the annual level, the variation of typhoon exposure is quite exogenous. There
are also concerns that local typhoon exposure may be associated with the general weather
or climate trends of El Niï¿œo-Southern Oscillation (ENSO) phenomenon and global warm-
ing(Goh and Chan, 2012), which may correlate with the economic development trend. For
example, global warming may increase local typhoon exposure while local transfers also fol-
low an increasing trend, the estimate for governmental responsiveness will be overestimated.
To take care of this concern, two methods are adopted. First, we include prefectural trends
in the specification model. Prefectural trends can capture the general typhoon exposure
trend and transfer decision trend, because counties within a prefecture are more likely to
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be exposed to similar climate pattern due to geographic closeness. In addition, the prefec-
tural trend can capture any transfer trend at prefecture level, such increasing or decreasing
transfer efficiency, because prefectures are the lowest administrative level executing transfer
money to local counties. Second, we use first-difference (FD) estimation to take care of the
year-to-year trend of both typhoon and outcome variables at county level. By differencing
out both outcome variables and typhoon exposure variable (maxs), we can remove the serial
correlation concerns of outcome variables and typhoon risks and get unbiased estimates.
3.5.1 Fixed Effects Model Specification
We use the following model specification for Fixed Effects (FE) estimation.
Yift = β0 + β1maxsift + αXift + µi + θt + γf t+ ift (3.3)
Where Yifpt is the dependent variable for county i in prefecture f of year t. We check typhoon
impacts on multiple dependent variables separately: logarithm of per capita transfer, loga-
rithm of per capita GDP and logarithm of per capita expenditure. maxsift is the maximum
wind speed of typhoon for county i in year t. Xift are temperature and precipitation controls
of county i in prefecture f of year t. µi is the county fixed effect. θt is year fixed effect. γf t is
the prefecture trend for each county i. Because transfer decision might be impacted by the
typhoon risk of neighboring counties as well, we cluster errors at the prefecture level, which
is one level higher than county to take account of correlations of counties within the same
prefecture.
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3.5.2 First-Difference Model Specification
We use the following model specification for First-Difference (FD) estimation.
∆Yift = β0 + β1∆maxsift + α∆Xift + µi + θt + ift (3.4)
Where ∆Yift = Yift−Yif(t−1) is the first difference of current year value and last year value for
outcome variables. ∆maxsift and ∆Xift are the first difference results of typhoon exposure
variables and weather control variables. The FD estimation structure can automatically
remove effects of county fixed effect factors in the fixed effects model specification, because
these terms will be dropped out after first differencing. µi in this specification model is
similar to the county specific trend in the FE model. Year fixed effects in the FE model will
be included in the constant terms of this model. Similar to the FE model, errors here will
also be clustered at the prefecture level.
For T = 2, the FE and FD estimators are numerically equivalent. However for panel data
with longer time periods, FE and FD estimators have their own advantages with respect to
different model assumptions. If the error structure follows a random walk, the FD estimator is
more efficient than FE estimator because the differential removes serial correlation perfectly.
Under the assumption of strong exogeneity of homoscedasticity and no serial correlation in
the errors, the FE estimator is more efficient than the FD estimator. In the following section,
we use two types of model specifications and report results of both methods (Wooldridge,
2001).
3.6 Results
All results are presented in four parts. We first show the average economic impacts of
typhoon exposure and governmental fiscal responsiveness to typhoon risks in all counties
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exposed to typhoon disasters. Both the FE and FD estimators are included. Then we
show the temporal heterogeneities of typhoon impacts on economic and fiscal outcomes
by including both historical and future typhoon exposures. This not only provides us the
temporal pattern of governmental responsiveness, but also helps to verify the validity of
data and model specification since future typhoon exposures are difficult to be predicted by
decision makers and hence to impact the fiscal decision making. In the third part, we show
heterogeneities of governmental responsiveness among local regions, and explore potential
factors related to governmental responsiveness. In the fourth part, we present the impacts
of the “province manage county" fiscal reform and political connections on governmental
responsiveness in China.
3.6.1 Average Governmental Responsiveness
This section mainly presents average impact estimates of typhoon exposure on economic
outcomes of GDP and governmental revenue, and how intergovernmental transfers change
with respect to typhoon risks. There have been many studies about the economic impacts
of typhoon shocks. The findings vary over negative impacts (Strobl, 2012) and no impacts
(Hallegatte et al., 2007) of typhoon exposure in various locations and targeting at different
scales of typhoon or hurricane events. However, the question on governmental responsiveness
was rarely studied. Here for the first time, we explore how governments use intergovernmental
transfers to help local governments cope with typhoon shocks.
GDP
In order to estimate the economic impacts of typhoon exposure, we use logarithm of per
capita GDP as the dependent variable for Equation (3.3) and (3.4). Table (3.2) shows
regression results of typhoon impacts on GDP. Column (1)-(4) report the FE estimates
with year and county fixed effects and prefectural trends. Column(5)-(8) report the FD
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estimates with county and year fixed effects. Both two methods confirm that typhoon
exposure measured by average maximum wind speed didn’t bring significant negative impacts
to macroeconomic performance of per capita GDP. In stead, we found a positive impact of
typhoon on GDP. The significances of estimates for current year typhoon exposure of “maxs"
are not stable when including historical and future exposures. The FE effects estimates are
at the edge of being significant at 90% confidence. The coefficient of current year exposure
is around 0.3-0.7%, meaning that typhoon exposure with average maximum wind speed
increasing by 10m/s may bring a 0.3-0.7% increase to per capita GDP to local regions in
China. In addition, only the current year typhoon exposure matters for the GDP change.
Neither past nor future exposures affect per capita GDP significantly. The positive impacts
may be associated with the increased rainfall associated with typhoon exposures for inland
regions of China, while coastal regions already have good adaptive capacity and disaster
relief ability to reduce the economic impacts to local regions. We provide more evidence
for this claim using the results for other outcome variables and heterogeneity analysis for
typhoon impacts.
Special Transfers
Table(3.3) presents the estimation results of governmental transfer responsiveness to typhoon
exposure. Special transfers increase by around 4-5%(from column (5)-(8)) on average for a
10m/s increase in average maximum wind speed in the current year. Both the FE and
FD estimates are quite consistent over the significance and magnitude of the estimated
coefficients. The results are also robust when controlling historical and future typhoon
exposures. FD and FE estimates are different for the historical typhoon impacts, with FE
estimates being significant and positive while FD estimates being insignificant and close to
zero. The difference may rise because of the serial correlations of typhoon exposures of maxs,
which can cause multi-linearity concerns using FE method. FD approach can help to solve
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the problem because it only uses the variation of annual differences of typhoon exposure
after first differencing. This shows that the central government increases targeting aids to
local regions for the current year exposure, comparing to the result of no changes for general
transfer to be shown later.
One thing to be noticed is that we don’t have data on intergovernmental transfers tar-
geting at typhoon disaster relief specifically. Special transfers here are just general targeting
transfers which include typhoon disaster relief transfer. In order to draw any claim about
the change of typhoon relief specific transfers, we need to assume that other special transfer
didn’t change with typhoon risks. For example, transfers for disaster relief of other natural
disasters like earthquake, non-typhoon induced flooding and droughts are included in the
special transfer category. But here we assume these disasters are not directly related to
typhoon risks.
In addition, because disaster relief transfer is only a small part of total special transfer,
the actual change percentage of disaster relief transfers responding to typhoon risks should be
larger than that of total special transfers. Estimate for total special transfer responsiveness
also has larger noise than that for disaster relief transfer responsiveness to typhoon risks,
if we assume other special transfers vary as well with the variation not related to typhoon
risks.
Governmental Welfare Expenditure
Similar to the previous problem of data unavailability of transfers targeting at typhoon
relief directly, we do not have governmental relief expenditure data. But we try to use a
similar term called welfare expenditure to proxy the governmental relief expenditure. Welfare
expenditure includes two types of governmental expenditures: expenditure for public health
and expenditure for social welfare. Related to typhoon disasters, welfare expenditure includes
all governmental expenses for disease treatment, medical service, aid to poor families and
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post-disaster relief expenditures related to typhoon shocks. Of course, welfare expenditure
also include similar services for other types of natural disasters such as earthquake, flooding
and droughts. As mentioned previously, here we assume these disasters are not related to
typhoon risks directly.
Table (3.4) lists the FE and FD regression estimates for governmental welfare expenditure
due to typhoon shocks. It shows that local regions increase welfare expenditure by 4-5% one
year after the typhoon shock for a typhoon disaster with maximum wind speed increasing by
10m/s. Local governments don’t response significantly to current year and future typhoon
exposures. This may be because aid and relief targeting at individuals or families take a
long time to be processed from individual level to the local governments. Or there might be
concerns of administrative inefficiency in local county governments for disaster relief.
Other Outcome Variables
We also check the impacts of typhoon exposure on other outcome variables like general
transfer, rice yield, governmental revenue, governmental expenditures and governmental in-
frastructure expenditures. Table(3.5) and Table (3.6) show the FE and FD estimates sep-
arately. Results from both methods are pretty consistent. Typhoon risks rarely impact
general transfers. As mentioned in the background part, general transfers are non-targeting
transfers which follow several routine formulas including elements like the ethnical com-
position, whether the local region is a designated poor region and population size etc. It
is reasonable to believe that general transfers shouldn’t vary together with typhoon risks.
The impact of maximum wind speed of typhoon disasters on rice yield and governmental
revenues are not significant. Total governmental expenditure increased in the typhoon hit
year. Comparing the result with welfare expenditure response to past-year typhoon hit,
it seems that local governments increase total expenditures but not on individual targeted
welfare expenditures. Local governments respond faster to disaster relief for non-household
102
or non-individual targeted purposes, such as infrastructure or public facility maintenance.
3.6.2 Heterogeneity of Governmental Responsiveness
The governmental responsiveness might be heterogenous for regions with different character-
istics. As mentioned previously, literatures generally agree that local impacts from typhoon
depend on many economic, cultural and social factors, such as income level, literary, govern-
mental effectiveness and media coverage etc. Here we mainly focus on two factors: economic
development level and background typhoon disaster strength.
Figure (3.4) shows the variability of typhoon impacts with respect to the historical ty-
phoon exposure level. Regions benefit from typhoon exposure are mainly areas exposed to
low level of typhoon shocks with average maximum wind speed below 10m/s. “High-Typhoon
Risky" regions are barely impacted in macroeconomic performance by typhoon shocks. The
benefits from typhoon might be regions benefiting from typhoon-induced rainfalls(Fumin
et al., 2002). However, special transfer increases are mainly observed in high risky regions.
It shows that the central government indeed transferred more to regions with extremely high
typhoon risks.
Figure (3.5) shows the variability of typhoon impacts with respect to economic devel-
opment condition. Poor regions generally receive more special transfers and have larger
governmental expenditures as responses to current year typhoon exposures. Especially for
regions ranked in the lower 50 percentile in terms of per capita GDP, both special transfer
and governmental expenditure increase significantly.
These two findings confirm the theoretical claims that transfers should respond to vul-
nerabilities, including natural vulnerability and economic vulnerability.
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3.6.3 County Specific Transfer Responsiveness
In addition to the national average impacts of typhoon hits, we are more interested in the
governmental responsiveness to typhoon in specific local regions. The central government
may transfer different amounts to local regions even when they are exposed to the same level
of typhoon risk. Here we define “transfer intensity index" as the average special transfer
percentage change corresponding to a certain magnitude of typhoon risk shock, i.e. increase
in average maximum wind speed by 10m/s. This index represents how strong the central
government will respond to local disaster exposure. As claimed in the theoretical model, this
index depends on two main factors: economic loss and decision weight of the local region.
Conditional on the same economic losses, this index can provide some implication on the
decision weight of local regions.
We use the following regression model to estimate the average economic and fiscal re-
sponsiveness to typhoon risks in local regions, i.e. βi. By differencing both the dependent
and explanatory variables, we can remove the serial correlation concerns of these variables
and use purely the variation of differences. In this case, βi estimates will be consistent and
unbiased.
∆Yit = β0 + βi∆maxsit + α∆Xit + it (3.5)
Where ∆Yit is the first difference of dependent variables in the current year and that
in the past year for county i of year t. ∆maxs is the first difference of average maximum
wind speed of the current year and that of the past year. Xit includes precipitation and
temperature controls.
Figure (3.7) maps the distribution of βi estimates using logarithm per capita special
transfer as the dependent variable. We can also call it transfer intensity index of local
regions in China. Polygons with red and yellow color represent larger transfer intensity,
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meaning that these regions receive more transfers than other regions for the same amount
of typhoon risks.
Figure (3.8) maps the distribution of βi estimates using logarithm per capita GDP as
the dependent variable. It shows that the macroeconomic performance of GDP were barely
impacted by typhoon risks in the coastal regions. However, a lot of the benefiting (shown
in red and yellow polygons) and damaged (shown in blue polygons) regions from typhoon
shocks are located inland.
In order to find out what kind of factors are correlated with the transfer intensity and
GDP impacts in local regions, we regress βi with a lot of county characteristics, including
average per capita GDP, population size, population density, ethnic minority, a dummy
variable showing whether the region was hit by typhoon every year or not and the average
maxs level for typhoon risks. Table (3.9) shows the β estimates for GDP, special transfer and
general transfer. It shows that special transfer intensity for unit typhoon exposure change
is larger for regions with larger population. A region with larger population receive not
only more total special transfers, but also per capita special transfers. Regions frequently
hit by typhoon receive lower special transfer. This reveals that the central government may
expect local regions to develop certain adaptive capacity to typhoon risks. This is consistent
with the finding by Hsiang and Narita (2012) of the adaption of regions constantly hit by
tropical cyclone globally. Even though the linear estimate of GDP impacts on typhoon
transfer intensity is insignificant, polynominal regression results indicated that poor regions
has larger transfer intensity for unit typhoon risk change, as plotted in Figure(3.6).
3.6.4 Fiscal Reform and Political Connection
Besides the variability of governmental responsiveness to typhoon exposures related to local
relief needs, such as economic level, population and frequency of typhoon exposure, gov-
ernmental efficiency and political network connection may also impact the transfer respon-
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siveness. The “province manages county" reform aims to increase efficiency of governmental
fiscal activities by removing the prefecture governments. After the reform, local governments
can receive transfers directly from the central government and provincial government. By
reducing the “leakage" of transfer money in the prefecture level, local regions are expected to
receive more transfers and respond to local demands faster. Column (1)-(2) in Table (3.11)
list the regression results including interaction of reform status and typhoon exposure. Local
regions receive more transfers after the reform, but the effect is not statistically significant.
How well local regions are connected to the central government, especially top leaders
in the central bureau is another factor impacting resource distribution problems in China.
There has been studies showing that better connection with the central government can lead
to more capital investment and favoring aids to enterprises Qin (2011). Here we explore how
provincial connections with the political bureau members impact governmental fiscal transfer
for typhoon risks. We use the political connection data built by Victor Shih (Shih, 2004).
Column(3)-(4) in Table (3.11) indicate better connection between the provincial governors
and the central government has an insignificant and positive impacts on the special transfers
for typhoon exposure.
3.7 Conclusion
Governmental disaster reliefs play an important role in reducing economic damages and
helping post-disaster recovery in local regions. For regions in face of large-scale and severe
disasters, intergovernmental transfers provide a potential risk-sharing mechanism across dif-
ferent governments. Is this system effective? Based on what considerations is the central
government making transfer decisions? This is the first paper tries to answer these questions
empirically. Using a self-built dataset on typhoon exposure over all counties and cities in
China from 1980 to 2008, We apply both fixed-effects and first-difference estimation methods
106
to estimate the average transfer responsiveness and heterogeneities in the responsiveness.
Results show that the central government do respond to the current-year local disasters,
by increasing transfers to regions in face of increasing typhoon exposures. On average, local
regions receive 5% more special transfers when the average maximum wind speed increases
by 10m/s. The transfer increase only observed for special transfers, which are targeting
transfers with usages restricted by the central government. Because we don’t have data on
disaster relief transfer, which is only part of special transfers, the result can be interpreted
as a lower bound of disaster relief transfer changes. The estimates are very unlikely to
be driven by other types of special transfers, considering the first-difference approach we
use and the temporal pattern of estimates. Neither future nor historical exposures impact
transfer responsiveness. We also find that local macroeconomic performance measured by per
capita GDP is not significantly damaged by typhoon exposures, even though tend to increase
expenditures targeting at social welfares, such as social security, health expenditures one year
after the typhoon disaster.
Transfer responsiveness estimates show heterogeneities across local regions, with higher
transfer efforts for more vulnerable regions: areas with low per capita GDP or high typhoon
risks. County-specific estimates for economic impacts and governmental responsiveness show
that regions experienced large GDP losses or benefits tend to be inland areas. The macroe-
conomy in coastal regions have adapted to frequent typhoon exposure very well. Special
transfer responsiveness is lower in regions hit by typhoon every year. This supports climate
adaption behavior in high typhoon exposure regions found by Hsiang and Narita (2012).
Special transfer responsiveness is also higher in more populated regions. However, spe-
cial transfer responsiveness is not significantly associated with population density, ethnicity
group composition and number of peer competitor counties within the same prefecture.
We also don’t find significant impacts of political connection and the “province manages
county" reform on transfer responsiveness. This coincides with the claim on obstacles of
107
the reform(Wang et al., 2011). The effectiveness might be low because it only targets at
the vertical fiscal structure change while the vertical administrative structure remaining the
same.
This paper contributes to the large literature on disaster relief, intergovernmental fiscal
relationship and typhoon impacts. According to climate change predictions, local regions in
China might be exposed to more frequent and more intensive typhoons. This research will
be helpful for both governments and non-governmental agents to better prepare for natural
disasters and establish more efficient and effective risk-sharing mechanisms.
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Tables and Figures
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
Variable Unit N Mean Standard Deviation max min Begin-Year End-Year
GDP Yuan 25272 7960.805 9091.269 266.6667 209368.8 1996 2008
Governmental Revenue Yuan 28663 380.7537 717.4942 5.060046 21581.81 1996 2008
General Transfer Yuan 20706 262.8195 374.8532 -1099.234 10527.47 1996 2006
Special Transfer Yuan 20659 127.0835 168.5602 -53.05914 5209.714 1996 2006
Governmental Expenditure Yuan 28241 1103.346 1453.001 23.65073 30136.7 1996 2008
Expenditure on Welfare Yuan 17289 40.34384 68.70531 -2860.227 1144.083 1996 2006
Population 28668 46.50446 34.18096 0.55 268.2 1996 2008
Average Max Wind Speed m/s 83317 4.976622 7.879083 0 55.1928 1980 2008
Power Dissipation Index 108units 83317 0.0100269 0.0329115 0 0.8575692 1980 2008
Temperature C degree 61690 12.29147 6.302399 -12.43854 27.20333 1980 2008
Precipitation mm/day 61690 2.818198 1.393159 0.0257652 8.614 1980 2008
Rice Yield t/ha 26031 5.399468 1.734563 0.0019599 19.43125 1980 2000
Notes: “Net Revenue Flow In" is the net fiscal revenue flow into local regions. It equals total transfer plus tax return from
the upper level governments minus remittance (submitted transfers from local governments to the central government).
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Table 3.2: Impacts of Typhoon on GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
maxs F2 0.291
(0.311)
maxs F1 0.344 0.482 0.656
(0.425) (0.306) (0.408)
maxs 0.679+ 0.761+ 0.719 0.760 0.298 0.455+ 0.821* 0.950*
(0.349) (0.405) (0.438) (0.489) (0.200) (0.269) (0.355) (0.423)
maxs T-1 0.397 0.344 0.431 0.293 0.444 0.453
(0.407) (0.468) (0.419) (0.294) (0.317) (0.373)
maxs T-2 -0.194
(0.338)
N 23325 23325 23325 21407 21026 21026 19116 17261
CFE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
YFE Y Y Y Y N N N N
trend pref pref pref pref FD FD FD FD
cluster pref pref pref pref pref pref pref pref
Notes: This table reports regression results using GDP as the dependent variable. Both the
fixed effects and first-differencing models include temperature and precipitation controls.
Column (1)-(4) presents the results for typhoon exposure in the current year and past few
years including county fixed effects, year fixed effects and prefectural trends. The unit of
coefficient estimate for average maximum wind speed(maxs) is percentage dependent variable
change for 10m/s increase in wind speed. Column(5)-(8) presents the first-differencing (FD)
estimators for typhoon exposure in the current year, past year and future years. Standard
errors clustered at prefecture level in parentheses. + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, ***
p < 0.001.
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Table 3.3: Impacts of Typhoon on Special Transfers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
maxs F2 0.270
(1.431)
maxs F1 1.349 -0.386 -0.177
(1.312) (1.427) (1.597)
maxs 5.087*** 5.677*** 7.224*** 6.020*** 4.813*** 4.652*** 4.388** 4.526**
(1.191) (1.245) (1.267) (1.340) (1.204) (1.241) (1.349) (1.624)
maxs T-1 2.910* 4.660*** 3.232** -0.329 -0.472 -0.397
(1.159) (1.393) (1.177) (1.127) (1.277) (1.364)
maxs T-2 5.599***
(1.571)
N 20605 20605 20605 20605 17948 17948 17948 17948
CFE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
YFE Y Y Y Y N N N N
trend pref pref pref pref FD FD FD FD
cluster pref pref pref pref pref pref pref pref
Notes: This table reports regression results using special transfer as the dependent variable.
Both the fixed effects and first-differencing models include temperature and precipitation
controls. Column (1)-(4) presents the results for typhoon exposure in the current year and
past few years including county fixed effects, year fixed effects and prefectural trends. The
unit of coefficient estimate for average maximum wind speed(maxs) is percentage depen-
dent variable change for 10m/s increase in wind speed. Column(5)-(8) presents the first-
differencing (FD) estimators for typhoon exposure in the current year, past year and future
years. Standard errors clustered at prefecture level in parentheses. + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05,
** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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Table 3.4: Impacts of Typhoon on Welfare Expenditure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
maxs F2 -2.849
(2.134)
maxs F1 0.233 -0.854 -3.100
(2.645) (2.467) (2.803)
maxs -0.178 1.038 0.741 1.110 -1.074 0.939 0.342 -1.166
(1.521) (1.508) (1.604) (1.885) (1.770) (1.709) (1.835) (2.087)
maxs T-1 5.420* 5.084* 5.480* 4.430* 4.105* 3.326
(2.154) (2.355) (2.407) (1.813) (2.054) (2.235)
maxs T-2 -1.129
(2.093)
N 17250 17250 17250 17250 15115 15115 15115 15115
CFE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
YFE Y Y Y Y N N N N
trend pref pref pref pref FD FD FD FD
cluster pref pref pref pref pref pref pref pref
Notes: This table reports regression results using welfare transfer as the dependent variable.
Both the fixed effects and first-differencing models include temperature and precipitation
controls. Column (1)-(4) presents the results for typhoon exposure in the current year and
past few years including county fixed effects, year fixed effects and prefectural trends. The
unit of coefficient estimate for average maximum wind speed(maxs) is percentage depen-
dent variable change for 10m/s increase in wind speed. Column(5)-(8) presents the first-
differencing (FD) estimators for typhoon exposure in the current year, past year and future
years. Standard errors clustered at prefecture level in parentheses. + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05,
** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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Table 3.5: Impacts of Typhoon on Other Outcome Variables Using FE Model
Rice Yield Gov. Gov. General Infrastructure
Revenue Expenditure Transfer Expenditure
maxs -0.817 -1.046+ 0.412 0.353 3.998
(0.595) (0.618) (0.395) (1.489) (3.733)
maxs T-1 -0.472 0.0214 -0.557 -2.590 -4.167
(0.441) (0.622) (0.409) (1.643) (3.637)
N 9710 21167 20749 19738 12988
CFE Y Y Y Y Y
YFE Y Y Y Y Y
trend pref pref pref pref pref
cluster pref pref pref pref pref
Notes: This table reports fixed effects estimators of typhoon impacts on several other out-
come variables. Precipitation and temperature are controlled in the regression. County fixed
effects, year fixed effects and prefectural trends are included. “maxs’ and “maxs T-1’ are
separately typhoon exposures of the current year and past year. The unit of coefficient esti-
mate for average maximum wind speed(maxs) is percentage dependent variable change for
10m/s increase in wind speed. Standard errors clustered at prefecture level in parentheses.
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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Table 3.6: Impacts of Typhoon on Other Outcome Variables Using FD Model
Rice Yield Gov. Gov. General Infrastructure
Revenue Expenditure Transfer Expenditure
maxs 0.349 -0.927 0.753* 2.552 1.240
(0.470) (0.603) (0.377) (1.780) (3.712)
maxs T-1 0.160 -0.192 -0.352 -2.476 -2.744
(0.393) (0.458) (0.322) (1.842) (3.231)
N 21562 18990 18554 17052 10466
CFE Y Y Y Y Y
YFE N N N N N
trend FD FD FD FD FD
cluster pref pref pref pref pref
Notes: This table reports first-difference estimators of typhoon impacts on several other
outcome variables. Precipitation and temperature are controlled in the regression. The
model also includes county fixed effects. “Maxs’ and “maxs T-1’ are separately typhoon
exposures of the current year and past year. The unit of coefficient estimate for average
maximum wind speed(maxs) is percentage dependent variable change for 10m/s increase
in wind speed. Standard errors clustered at prefecture level in parentheses. + p < 0.1, *
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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Table 3.7: Relationship Between Administration Level and Governmental Responsiveness
(FE)
GDP Special General Welfare Gov.
Transfer Transfer Expenditure Revenue
maxs -0.176 7.034** -0.314 0.572 -1.991*
(0.648) (2.137) (2.241) (2.478) (0.972)
countyXmaxs 1.348* -2.037 0.903 0.700 1.239
(0.643) (2.049) (2.314) (2.565) (1.012)
L.maxs 0.780 6.081** -6.662** 4.703 -1.090
(0.708) (1.872) (2.402) (3.178) (1.023)
countyXL.maxs -0.404 -4.376* 5.020* 1.366 1.623
(0.748) (1.978) (2.535) (3.490) (1.203)
N 19400 20541 19738 17213 21089
CFE Y Y Y Y Y
YFE Y Y Y Y Y
trend pref pref pref pref pref
cluster pref pref pref pref pref
Notes: This table reports FD estimation results for administration level and governmental
responsiveness in local regions. Local regions are composed of two types, city and county. In
the regression, city was set as the default group. The unit of coefficient estimate for average
maximum wind speed(maxs) is percentage dependent variable change for 10m/s increase
in wind speed. Standard errors clustered at prefecture level in parentheses. + p < 0.1, *
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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Table 3.8: Relationship Between Administration Level and Governmental Responsiveness
(FD)
GDP Special General Welfare Gov.
Transfer Transfer Expenditure Revenue
maxs -0.0499 3.646 4.259+ -8.621* -1.621*
(0.410) (2.766) (2.242) (4.233) (0.670)
countyXmaxs 1.019* -0.248 3.733 10.51* 0.957
(0.461) (2.663) (2.327) (4.377) (0.758)
L.maxs 0.856* -3.799+ -5.271+ -14.95*** -0.273
(0.425) (2.005) (3.032) (3.442) (0.603)
countyXL.maxs -0.368 -2.073 8.028** 11.79** 0.363
(0.476) (2.112) (3.033) (4.064) (0.693)
N 17219 17931 17035 15109 18937
CFE Y Y Y Y Y
YFE Y Y Y Y Y
trend FD FD FD FD FD
cluster pref pref pref pref pref
Notes: This table reports FD estimation results for administration level and governmental
responsiveness in local regions. Local regions are composed of two types, city and county. In
the regression, city was set as the default group. The unit of coefficient estimate for average
maximum wind speed(maxs) is percentage dependent variable change for 10m/s increase
in wind speed. Standard errors clustered at prefecture level in parentheses. + p < 0.1, *
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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Table 3.9: Factors Impacting Governmental Responsiveness
(1) (2) (3)
GDP Special Transfer General Transfer
Ln per capita GDP -2.228* 1.448 3.884
(1.022) (2.284) (2.361)
Ln pop 0.253 5.914** 1.565
(0.871) (1.945) (2.237)
population density 0.00293 -0.00776 0.00107
(0.00220) (0.00696) (0.00574)
Han ratio -0.414 9.339 5.858
(2.118) (5.334) (5.521)
Annually hit by typhoon -2.550 -12.25** -1.769
(1.742) (4.247) (4.964)
Average maxs 0.0223 0.309 0.153
(0.152) (0.610) (0.582)
#of county/cities within prefecture 0.00911 -0.0605 -0.0285
(0.130) (0.343) (0.485)
N 1215 1151 1086
adj. R-sq 0.127 0.211 0.124
Notes: “Annually Hit by Typhoon" is a dummy variable, which equals to 1 if the region was
hit annually by typhoon from 1996 to 2006, and 0 otherwise. “Han ratio" is the ratio of Han
population in total population for each local region in 2000. Standard errors clustered at
prefecture level in parentheses. + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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Table 3.10: Correlation of County Specific Estimates for Fiscal and Economic Variables
Special Transfer General Transfer GDP Gov Revenue
General Transfer -0.19***
GDP -0.19*** 0.12***
Gov Revenue -0.03 -0.07** -0.07**
Gov Expenditure 0.14*** 0.02 -0.84*** 0.17***
Notes: This table reports the correlation of county specific estimates for the main fiscal and
economic variables with respect to typhoon exposure which is measured by maxs, including
special transfer, general transfer, GDP, governmental revenue and governmental expendi-
ture.** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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Table 3.11: Relationship Between Reform and Political Connections and Governmental Re-
sponsiveness
(1) (2) (3) (4)
maxs 4.791*** 4.383** 2.517 5.912+







Method FE FD FE FE
Trend pref pref pref
Notes: “Reform" =1 if the region finishes “province manages county" reform. “Connect"=1
if the provincial governors is connected with the political bureau members by “Long March"
experience, common working experience, education experience and birth province. The
unit of coefficient estimate for average maximum wind speed(maxs) is percentage dependent
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Figure 3.1: County Average Typhoon Exposure: 1980-2008
Notes: This graph plots the average typhoon exposure to all local regions each year. The
red line represents average maximum wind speed. The blue line represents power dissipation
density index.
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Figure 3.2: Map of Typhoon Exposure of Counties in China (Average Maximum Wind
Speed:m/s)
Notes: This map plots the annual mean Average Maximum Wind Speed (maxs) from 1980
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Figure 3.3: Trend of Intergovernmental Transfers in China (1993-2010)
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Figure 3.4: Heterogeneity of Typhoon Impacts With Respect to Local Typhoon Risks
Notes: Four graphs in this figure plot the estimates and 95% confidence intervals for typhoon
impacts using sub-sample data of specific typhoon exposure bins, for three variables: GDP,
Special Transfer and Governmental Expenditure from top left to bottom. Typhoon exposure
bins are constructed based on the average historical typhoon exposure of local regions from
1980 to 2008. In all, we use 10 bins for typhoon exposure. The black solid line represents
estimates. The dotted lines are 95% confidence intervals. The bottom right graph is the
distribution histogram of historical average max wind speed. The unit of coefficient estimate
for average maximum wind speed(maxs) is percentage dependent variable change for 10m/s
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Figure 3.5: Heterogeneity of Typhoon Impacts With Respect to Local Economic Level
Notes: Four graphs in this figure plot the estimates and 95% confidence intervals for typhoon
impacts using sub-sample data of specific per capita GDP bins, for three variables: GDP,
Special Transfer and Governmental Expenditure from top left to bottom. Per capita GDP
bins are constructed based on the average historical GDP level of local regions from 1996 to
2008. In all, we use 10 bins, with each bin representing a decile of per capita GDP. The black
solid line represents estimates. The dotted lines are 95% confidence intervals. The bottom
right graph is the distribution histogram of average per capita GDP of local regions. The
unit of coefficient estimate for average maximum wind speed(maxs) is percentage dependent
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kernel = epanechnikov, degree = 0, bandwidth = .38, pwidth = .58
Figure 3.6: Scatter Plot of Transfer Intensity Estimates in Local Regions
Notes: This figure plots the β estimates for governmental special transfers using equation
3.5. A polynomial line with 95% confidence interval was fit on the scatter dots. The unit of
coefficient estimate for average maximum wind speed(maxs) is percentage dependent variable
change for 10m/s increase in wind speed.
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Figure 3.7: Governmental Responsiveness to Typhoon Exposure in Local Regions of China
Measured by Special Transfers
Notes: This graph plots the average transfer responsiveness estimate to typhoon hits for
each county separately. The estimated coefficients are obtained through βi for each county
i from equation 3.5, using logarithm of per capita transfer as the dependent variable. The
unit of coefficient estimate for average maximum wind speed(maxs) is percentage dependent
variable change for 10m/s increase in wind speed.
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Figure 3.8: Average Impacts of Typhoon Hits on GDP in Local Counties of China
Notes: This graph plots the average impact of typhoon risks on GDP for each county sepa-
rately. The estimated coefficients are obtained through βi for each county i from equation
3.5, using logarithm of per capita GDP as the dependent variable. The unit of coefficient
estimate for average maximum wind speed(maxs) is percentage dependent variable change
for 10m/s increase in wind speed.
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Chapter 4




Economic growth has reshaped rural household characteristics dramatically in the past few
decades in China. Families become richer, smaller and older. How do these changes impact
household water and electricity demands? This paper answers the question using household
data in a water-scarce rural village in Northern China. I find that smaller families tend
to increase per capita water and electricity consumptions by more than 20% for one fewer
family member. Households with more women in the family have higher water and electricity
consumptions even when controlling the family size. Both water and electricity consumptions
increase in hotter and drier months. Smaller households are more sensitive to weather
variabilities by increasing water use more in face of temperature increases. These findings
provide implications on rural water and electricity demand in the context of urbanization
and larger weather variability for water-scarce regions in developing countries.
1This research was funded by the Doctoral Empedocle Maffia Fellowship by Center for International
Conflict Resolution in Columbia University.
4.1 Introduction
Around 783 million people don’t have access to safe drinking water globally. 80 percent of
them live in rural areas (WBCSD, 2005). Around 1.3 billion people don’t have access to
electricity globally. 85 percent of them live in rural areas (IEA, 2009). There are a lot of
stress to meet water and electricity demands in rural areas. Meanwhile, climate change,
associated from weather variabilities, might bring pressure not only on water supplies, but
also on water demands. So understanding household water and electricity consumption
behavior in rural areas in development countries is very important for policy making on
rural water and electricity supply.
For China specifically, around 300 million rural people don’t have access to stable safe
drinking water2. On one hand, the fast urbanization process in China has changed rural
household structures significantly, with households becoming smaller, richer, older and occu-
pied by children and women more. On the other hand, a large part of China faces increasing
risks of extreme heat and droughts under the impact of climate change. Both household
characteristic changes and climate change may impact local water and electricity demands
and bring pressure on the supply side to meet these demands. This paper aims to study
household water use and electricity consumption behavior and how weather variabilities
change water and electricity demands in rural China.
I use Nanhe village as a special case to answer the above questions. Nanhe village is a
typical rural village in northern China, with a total population around 3500. The average
annual income per household is around 20,000 CNY in 2009. I collect water, electricity and
household data from the village committee and local electricity authority for all households
registered in the village. OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) approaches for cross-section and
2According to 12th Five-Year-Plan on Rural Safe Drinking Water Projects, by NDRC(National Develop-
ment and Reform Committee)
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panel data are used to estimate impacts of household characteristics and weather variables
on water and electricity demands.
Household size shows a strong scale-economy effect for per capita water and electricity
consumptions. An additional family member correlates with a 24% decrease in per capita
water use. The results are consistent with findings in other papers (Schleich and Hillenbrand,
2009; Jorgensen et al., 2009; Gaudin, 2006). Number of female members in the family is
significantly correlated with per capita water and electricity consumption, with an estimated
coefficient around 6-7%. Due to missing data on household income, I use electricity consump-
tion in March 20093 as the proxy for household income for analysis about income impacts on
water use. Result shows that water use is significantly correlated with electricity or income
level. The energy elasticity for water use is around 0.136. This number is slightly smaller
than other estimates for income elasticity (Zhang, 2005). Neither household head gender nor
maximum age in the households are significantly correlated with per capita water use and
electricity consumption.
Households tend to use more water and electricity in dry and hot months. Per capita
water use decreases by 0.7% for 10mm increase in the monthly precipitation and increases
by 2% for 1 Celsius degree increase in temperature. Per capita electricity consumption de-
creases by 4% for every 10mm increase in precipitation and increases by 2% for 1 Celsius
increase in temperature. These results are consistent with studies done in other developed
countries (Pint, 1999; Danielson, 1979). By checking impacts of household characteristics on
water and electricity consumption change corresponding to weather variabilities, I find that
local households are quite similar in the electricity adjustment behavior in face of temper-
ature changes. However, for water use adjustment in face of temperature changes, smaller
households tend to respond more and increase water consumption more. This confirms the
3The water use data are from April to August. The income proxy is the electricity consumption one
month earlier.
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claim that small households are more sensitive to external changes (Arbués et al., 2010).
The above results are robust to cross-sectional, pooled OLS and fixed effects estimation
specifications. One concern of the study is that local households occasionally use ground
water as an alternative of the metered pipe water. Due to water deterioration, ground
water are mainly used for washing and watering plants in the village. These water uses
are more sensitive to temperature and precipitation changes. So the estimates derived in
this paper for weather responsiveness of water use can be interpreted as a lower bound of
the true water responses. Due to the short study period in this paper, the results mainly
describe how households in the rural village vary their water and electricity use for seasonal
variation of temperature and precipitation. For further implications of water and electricity
use responses for climate change, longer time periods are needed. Northern China generally
face teh challenges of increased temperature and increased rainfall (Piao et al., 2010). The
weather effects will be strengthened by the urbanization process. This puts huge pressure
on water and electricity supply system to meet the increasing demands.
This is the first paper studying household water and electricity consumption behavior
and responses to weather variabilities in rural China. The paper contributes to the large
literature on water use, electricity consumption and weather variability. Results found in
the paper have great policy implications on water and electricity supply in rural regions and
water resource allocation in the context of urbanization and seasonal weather variations.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the background of this study.
Section III shows the data used in this paper. Section IV covers the empirical model speci-
fication. Section V presents the results and Section VI concludes.
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4.2 Background
Water and electricity are two basic needs in human daily life. Based on the destination,
uses are categorized into agricultural, industrial, residential and commercial uses. Even
though residential water and electricity consumptions only make a small proportion of their
total uses, accounting for 8% of total water use (WBCSD, 2005) and 36% of total energy
consumption (IEA, 2009), they are key for human health and basic living. Understanding the
water and electricity consumption behaviors are crucial for sustainable water and electricity
supply. It is generally agreed in literatures that water and electricity consumptions are
impacted by price, income, household characteristics and weather comprehensively.
4.2.1 Water and Electricity Consumption
Price and Income
Price is the primary factor identified impacting water and electricity consumptions. Price
elasticity estimation has been the research focus for a long time. For both water and electric-
ity sectors, there are various price schemes applied globally, including unit price, increasing
block price and decreasing block price. The main difficulty for estimating price elasticity is
to choose an appropriate price variable. Several forms of prices have been used in different
models, such as marginal price, average price or the combination of the two. Generally, the
price elasticity estimate for water use ranges from -0.2 to -0.8 (Billings and Agthe, 1980;
Nieswiadomy, 1992; Gaudin et al., 2001). The price elasticity for electricity consumption
ranges from -0.2 to -0.4(Filippini, 1995; Espey and Espey, 2004; Reiss and White, 2005).
Income is another factor that can impact water use directly and indirectly. The direct
income effect is that higher income results into more water and electricity consumption
because of higher purchasing power. But direct income effect is very small, considering that
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water and electricity fee takes a very small proportion of total household income (Gaudin
et al., 2001; Garcia and Reynaud, 2004). Indirect income effects refer to behavior changes
due to income change. For example, households may install more water-using facilities, or
purchase more water-saving and energy efficient appliances when there is an income increase.
The combination of direction and indirect impacts makes the income elasticity on water and
energy use quite non-linear and ambiguous (Campbell et al., 2004). Estimates for income
elasticity of electricity consumption have a mean value of 0.28 for short-run income elasticity
and 0.97 for long-run income elasticity (Branch, 1993; Alberini et al., 2011; Dergiades and
Tsoulfidis, 2008; Espey and Espey, 2004). Estimates for income elasticity for water use have
median around 0.35 and mean around 0.41 (Dalhuisen et al., 2003).
Household Characteristics
Besides price and income, household characteristics are also correlated with household water
and electricity consumption. These characteristics include household size, age structure,
gender structure, educational level of household members, house type, house area, garden
area, and building age etc.
Larger households tend to use more total water and energy and less in per capita terms.
(Arbues et al., 2003; Gregory and Leo, 2003; Reiss and White, 2005; Schleich and Hillen-
brand, 2009). Most studies on water and electricity consumption find quite similar mag-
nitudes for household size. One additional family member is estimated to increase total
water use by 8% (Hoffmann et al., 2006) and electricity consumption by 7% (Branch, 1993).
The relationship of age and water and electricity consumption is more complex. Families
with more young people and children may use more water because they have more outdoor
activities (Gregory and Leo, 2003; Nauges, 2003). Also families with more elderly consume
more water and electricity.
Among many household characteristics, the characteristics of the household head are also
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considered to be an important element. It was believed that household members tend to
learn from the water and electricity consumption behavior of household head. For example,
household with female household head might be more water saving (Campbell et al., 2004).
Weather Variability
Both water and electricity consumption also respond to weather variabilities. Though resi-
dential water use is not as responsive to weather as agricultural water use, it does respond
to a certain level. Typical weather elements impacting residential water use include pre-
cipitation, temperature, maximum daily temperature, and rainy days etc (Hoffmann et al.,
2006). People might shower more and wash more if temperature goes higher ( Taylor et al.,
2004; Olmstead et al., 2007). The impact of precipitation is ambiguous, because more pre-
cipitation may correspond not only to less plant-watering and outdoor activities, but also
to higher need of washing due to stains or mud. Maidment and Miaou (1986) found that
household water uses was correlated with both the occurrence and the magnitude of rainfall
significantly.
The relationship between residential electricity consumption and temperature has been
widely studied. Crowley (2003) claimed that total energy consumption would increase by
3.8% for every 2 Celsius degree increase. Deschenes (2011) find a U-shape curve for electricity
consumption and temperature. Electricity increases in very cold and hot days. Auffham-
mer and Aroonruengsawat (2011) also studied the non-linear relationship between electricity
consumption and temperature. Once temperature exceeds 80F (26.7 Celsius ) degree, the
average percentage change of electricity consumption is around 1-4% for unit F degree in-
crease.
So far most of the studies were done in developed countries or urban regions in developing
countries. Hoffmann et al. (2006) surveyed all published journal articles on residential water
use since 1980 and found that 56% are sampled in US, 24% in Europe, 16% in Australia,
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and the other 4% from other regions. However, water use challenge is especially high in
those less studied areas, where water use level is typically very lower, and households are
more vulnerable to water shortages. Rural water and electricity consumptions in developing
countries are still not well studied. However, these are the regions experiencing fast social
and economic changes and suffering from water and electricity restraints. So studies focus-
ing on water and electricity behaviors in rural regions in development countries have huge
policy implications. This paper first time studies the water and electricity behaviors of rural
households in a water scarce region of China.
4.2.2 Nanhe Village
The studied area in this paper is Nanhe Village in Northern China (shown in Figure (4.1)).To-
tal population in the village is around 3500, with 880 households registered in the village
in 2009. Average annual income per household is around 20,000 CNY (or 3000 US Dollar).
Main income sources of Nanhe Village are agriculture crops, one iron mine and four livestock
farms. Agricultural revenue contributes to around 40% of total household income. Pipe wa-
ter system in Nanhe Village was built in 2007 and it has been serving the village since then.
The water price structure follows the decreasing block rate at 3CNY/ton for the first 2 tons
and 2.5Yuan/ton for further amount. Nanhe has a wet and hot summer season and a dry
and cold winter season. Annual average precipitation is around 700mm, with most of the
rain falling between May and September. Annual average temperature is around 15 Celsius
Degree. For ease of management, the whole village is divided into 9 groups from east to
west. Group 1, 2 and 3 are in the east part of village with low elevation (with an average at
3140 ft) and Group 8, 9 are in the west part of village with high elevation (with an average
at 3180 ft). There are more ground water wells in the east part than the west part, because
the ground water level is much lower in the east.
Pipe water and privately-own shallow ground water are the two main water sources for
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local villagers. Because of ground water deterioration and water level decline due to nearby
minings, most people have already switched from ground water to pipe water. Currently, all
of the drinking and cooking water are from pipe water, but occasionally ground water is still
used for washing, cleaning and watering. This means that actual water use is higher than
the metered water used in this paper. Because water used for washing, cleaning or watering
is more sensitive to weather variability than water used for cooking, drinking or bathing, I
believe the estimates on water use responses to weather variabilities in the following empirical
analysis are lower bounds of the true values.
4.2.3 Data
I use three different datasets for the empirical analysis: water use data, electricity consump-
tion data and household characteristic data.
Household water use data in the village were collected by the village committee. A water
manager is assigned to record household water meter readings once every month. I obtained
monthly accumulated water meter readings from March to August in 2009. Based on this,
monthly household water use was calculated from April to August. Table (4.1) reports the
summary statistics of monthly water uses. The monthly average household water use is
around 1.7-2.4 m3 for each household. The average water use per capita per day is 14-26
liters, which is very low comparing to the UN requirement of 20-50 liters for residential
water use. Local households tend to use ground water occasionally for purposes of washing
or watering plants. During the study period, average household water use increased from
April to July, reaching maximum in July, and then decreased in August to a level a bit lower
than that in April. Figure (4.2) plots the distribution of per capita water use in April and
July. There is an obvious rightward shift in the distribution curve.
Household characteristics data in 2009 was obtained from the village committee. It covers
characteristics like household size, gender and age composition of family members, household
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head and group belonging of each household. Local village committee updates the records
every year take take account of population change and household structure changes4. Table
(4.1) shows that most household heads are male. The average household has 4 members and
2 females. The average age of the oldest person within family is around 52 years old.
electricity consumption data was provided by the local electricity supply company. Elec-
tricity bills are paid every other month in the local village. I got electricity for the registered
households from September 2007 to May 2009. Table (4.1) lists the average electricity con-
sumption for every two months. The average electricity consumption is around 0.5-0.7 kwh
per person per day, which is low comparing to the national average of 0.65 kwh in 2000
(Zhang, 2004) and 9 kwh in California in 1999 (Ito, 2012)
I also calculated the monthly average temperature and precipitation of local county based
on temperature records from CRU(Climate Research Unit in University of East Angolia)
database and precipitation records from National Centers for Environmental Prediction,
NOAA(National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration). Figure (4.3) plots the trend of
monthly precipitation and temperature in 2009. Precipitation was the highest n August.
Because each dataset has different identifiers, some identified by household head name
and some by the oldest member, I manually match the households based on names of family
members for all three datasets. In all, I get 500 households after matching. Table (4.1)
lists the summary statistics of variables before and after match. T-test results shows that
there are no significant differences for household characteristics and electricity consumption
variables before and after match. Water use in the matched households are slightly higher
than that of all households. The reason for the discrepancy of data before and after match
may be labor migration. Because of the increasing labor migration to urban areas in the
village, many households live outside the village occasionally, like nearby cities or towns,
4For example, people tend to separate from their parents after marriage, even though they still live in
the same village.
138
even though they are still registered in the village. So their water use in the village usually
is lower than the village average. Due to mobility, these households are less likely to be
matched across different datasets. In addition, The matched households represent those
living a relatively stable life in the village. So it is reasonable to believe that analysis based
on the matched households can represent the water use and electricity consumption condition
of the whole village very well.
4.3 Empirical Strategy
I use OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) estimations for the empirical analysis on water use
pattern and water use adjustments. For impacts of household characteristics on water use,
I use both cross-section and pooled OLS estimations. Explanatory household characteristic
variables include family size, # of females in the family, household head gender, age of the
oldest family member and committee group to which the household belongs to. For impacts
of weather variables on water use, I use fixed effects models, as specified here.
Yim = α1Temperaturem + α2Precipitationm + γi + im (4.1)
where Y is the dependent variable for household i in month m. For electricity consumption
analysis, I also include year fixed effects to control for annually fixed factors, such as local
electricity facility maintenance.
Slightly different from other studies on water demand functions (Olmstead et al., 2007),
price is not included here. Since all households in this study are in the same village and
exposed to the same price structure during the study period, there are not enough variations
in exposed price. In addition, even if we can calculate the marginal price or average price
based on the simple increasing block price structure, simple OLS regression will just generate
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a positive coefficient on price for water use, which cannot be interpreted as the price elasticity
for water use.
There might be OVB (Omitted Variable Bias) concerns in this specification due to miss-
ing variables, especially income variables. For example, if household income is positively
correlated with family size, considering that richer households can afford more children5 and
income is also positively correlated with water use, the coefficient estimate for household size
might be biased upward if income is not controlled. To correct the OVB problem, household
income was proxied by electricity in March 2009. There has been many studies found sig-
nificant correlations of income and electricity consumption (Dergiades and Tsoulfidis, 2008;
Alberini et al., 2011; Branch, 1993). Of course, this is not a perfect proxy for income, because
there are also factors impacting electricity consumption, like electricity price. In this paper,
I mainly use it to verify the robustness of estimates for other household characteristics.
4.4 Results
The results are present in two sections separately: results on residential water use levels and
changes.
4.4.1 Residential Water and Electricity Consumption
Table (4.2) reports the cross-section (column 1,2) and pooled OLS (column 3,4) estimation
for household characteristics impacting household water use. Column(1) and (2) reports
results using the April water use data only. Household size shows a strong scale-economy
effect. An additional family member correlates with 24% decrease in per capita water use.
This coefficient is smaller than results in Schleich and Hillenbrand (2009) and Jorgensen
et al. (2009), which were between 0.4 and 0.5. But it is close to Gaudin (2006)’s result with
5Rural families in Shanxi Province are allowed to have a second child in 2009.
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coefficient around 0.25. Number of female members in the family is significantly correlated
with per capita water use in the pooled OLS results. One more female member increases
the per capita water use by around 8.7%. Even though its significance disappear in the
cross-section results, the estimate value remain around 6-7%. Water use is also significantly
correlated with electricity or income level. The energy elasticity for water use is around 0.136.
This number is slightly smaller than estimates from Zhang (2005). The potential reason is
that households in local region occasionally use pumped water from shallow ground wells for
some residential use purposes. The coefficient of electricity elasticity for water use here is the
combination of income effects and substations between metered pipe water and ground water
uses. Neither household head gender nor maximum age in the households are significantly
correlated with household water use.
Besides household characteristics, weather variables also impact rural residential water
use. Households tend to use more water in dry and hot months. Per capita water use
decreases by 0.7% when the monthly precipitation increases by 10mm, while it increases
by 2% for 1 degree increase in temperature. Theses results are quite robust for both fixed
effects and other pooled OLS estimations. Similar responses to weather variabilities were also
found in other studies on water use behaviors(Pint, 1999; Danielson, 1979). Figure(4.4) plots
the estimate and confidence interval for each month of the pooled OLS model specification.
Water uses increase significantly by more than 10% and 30% in June and July comparing
to the level in April. Then in August, the water use level declines back to the April level.
Comparing this pattern with the monthly temperature and precipitation pattern as shown
in Figure (4.3), water use changes closely with the weather.
I also analyzed the relationship between total water use change with household char-
acteristics. As shown in column(1) of Table (4.3), total water use are not correlated with
family size anymore (Arbués et al., 2010). This confirms the scale-effect findings that larger
households are better for per capita water use by sharing certain water use facilities to-
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gether. Similar to per capita water use results, number of females in the family and weather
characteristics also impact total water use. Older family members tend do reduce water
use. Analysis on electricity consumption show similar patterns for water use, with higher
water uses in drier and hotter months. Estimates for weather variables are robust using both
pooled OLS (in Table (4.3)) and fixed effects (in Table (4.4)) approaches. Both water and
electricity consumption show similar percentage changes for one degree increase in temper-
ature. Temperature estimates are also similar in magnitude as other findings on electricity
consumption response to temperature (Auffhammer and Aroonruengsawat, 2011;Costa and
Kahn, 2010; Deschenes, 2011). However, the response of electricity consumption to precipi-
tation is much larger than that for water use. One potential reason is that local electricity
supply is very unstable and vulnerable for lightning and rainfall events, which can cause
blackouts frequently. In addition, local electricity manager will shut off power to avoid
damages for heavy rainfalls.
4.4.2 Temperature Variability
As shown in the previous results, residential water use experiences gradual increases and
decreases from April to May. Besides the average response to weather variability, another
question is how household characteristics impact the water use adjustment behavior. In
order to answer the question, I interact several household characteristics with temperature
in the regression.
Table (4.5) reports results by including interactions of electricity consumption in May
2009, household head gender, number of females and family size with temperature. Larger
families respond less to temperature changes. An additional member in the family can
decrease the response to temperature by 0.4%. This corresponds to similar findings on the
relationship between family size, water use adjustment and weather adaptions. Arbués et al.
(2010) shows that small households are more sensitive to price changes for water use in
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Spain. Deressa et al. (2009) finds that larger households are more open to weather adaptive
technologies and practices. Neither income proxied by electricity consumption nor household
gender structure impact water use responsiveness to temperature variations significantly.
I also checked impacts of household characteristics on water use adjustment during the
water use increase (April-July) and decrease period (July-August). Cross-sectional analysis
on the water use changes for these two periods are presented in Table (4.6). The findings con-
firms the previous results on the relationship between household size and water use changes.
Larger households tend to adjust less. In addition, households with male household heads
tend to adjust more, both in the water increasing and decreasing periods. Generally, water
use adjustment moves in the opposite direction to water use level at the beginning period.
Households use large amount of water tend to decrease water use in the future. This holds
for both the water use increasing and decreasing period.
Table (4.7) reports results by including interactions of electricity consumption in May
2009, household head gender, number of females and family size with temperature. It shows
that none of household characteristics impact electricity consumption response to temper-
ature. Household income proxied by per capita electricity consumption in May 2009 has a
significant negative coefficient. However, because the weakness of using part of the dependent
variable as the proxy, the estimate for the interaction term might be biased.
4.5 Conclusions
Residential water and electricity demands have been reshaped by both household charac-
teristics and weather variabilities. Understanding the connection between water, electricity
and weather variability is important for water and electricity supply. This is especially true
in rural regions of developing countries. I modeled household water and electricity demand
model in a rural village in Northern China using household level panel data.
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Both household size and number of females in the family impact water and electricity
consumption significantly. Household size shows a strong scale-economy effect for per capita
water and electricity consumptions. An additional family member correlates with 24% de-
crease in per capita water use. Women tend to use more water and electricity in the local
village, with water use increasing by around 6-7% for one more woman in the family. Nei-
ther household head gender nor maximum age in the households are significantly correlated
with per capita water use and electricity consumption. In addition, water and electricity
consumptions are closely associated with weather variables. Households tend to use more
water and electricity in dry and hot months. Per capita water use decreases by 0.7% when
the monthly precipitation increases by 10mm, while it increases by 2% for 1 Celsius degree
increase in temperature. Per capita electricity consumption decreases by 4% for every 10mm
increase in precipitation and increases by 2% for 1 Celsius increase in temperature. For
water use adjustment in face of temperature changes, smaller households tend to respond
more and increase water consumption more.
The above results are robust to cross-sectional, pooled OLS and fixed effects estimation
specifications. Due to exclusion of ground water in the analysis, the estimates derived in this
paper for weather responsiveness of water use can be interpreted as a lower bound of the
true water responses. Another finding is the high similarity between temperature response of
water and electricity around 2% per one celsius degree change. The result is also similar to
other studies done in development countries. This may imply that there are some generality
among temperature responsiveness for basic water and electricity consumption beyond the
social and economic contexts. Further studies might be needed to nail down potential specific
factors driving the similar results.
This is the first paper studying household water and electricity consumption behavior and
responses to weather variabilities in rural China. The results may provide policy implications
on water and electricity supply in rural regions. Linking the estimated results with the
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weather predication of increased temperature and increased rainfall in Northern China (Piao
et al., 2010), water and electricity demands will increase in local regions. The effects might
be strengthened by the urbanization process. This will put huge pressure on water and
electricity supply system to meet the increasing demands. Of course, longer time series data





Table 4.1: Summary Statistics
Before Merge After Merge T-test
Variable Mean sd obs Mean sd obs
Water use(unit: m3)
April 1.7 2.0 797 1.8 1.6 550 0.28
May 1.7 1.7 797 1.8 1.6 550 0.06+
June 2.1 1.9 797 2.3 1.9 550 0.05+
July 2.4 2.4 797 2.6 2.4 550 0.13
August 1.5 1.5 797 1.7 1.5 550 0.02*
Household characteristics
Group 5.0 2.7 664 5.0 2.6 550 1.00
HH Gender 1.0 0.1 664 1.0 0.1 550 0.23
Family Size 4.0 1.4 664 4.0 1.3 550 0.84
# of Females 1.9 0.9 664 1.9 0.9 550 0.91
Max Age 52.1 10.5 664 51.8 10.5 550 0.51
electricity consumption(unit: kwh)
Jan 92.3 167.3 815 85.7 91.9 550 0.40
Mar 130.4 229.6 816 123.2 138.7 550 0.51
May 100.3 199.0 816 90.6 81.6 550 0.28
Notes: “Group" denotes the committee group a household belongs to.“Before Merge" data are the raw balanced data
sample for each separate dataset of water use, household characteristics and electricity consumption. “After Merge" data
are the balanced dataset after merging three datasets. T-test results present the p-value of T-tests for equal mean for
“before merge" and “after merge" data. + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 4.2: Factors Impacting Residential Water Use
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Family Size -0.240*** -0.244*** -0.294*** -0.295***
(0.0317) (0.0311) (0.0157) (0.0155)
# of Female 0.0722 0.0648 0.0874*** 0.0882***
(0.0448) (0.0443) (0.0213) (0.0211)
Max age -0.0166 -0.0124 -0.00155 -0.00107
(0.0247) (0.0248) (0.0124) (0.0123)
HH Gender 0.0158 -0.0105 0.0985 0.101







Constant 6.965*** 6.383*** 6.627*** 6.955*** 5.729***
(0.373) (0.388) (0.201) (0.197) (0.0540)
Controls Month Dummies
Household FE Y
N 512 508 2579 2579 2579
Adjusted R2 0.168 0.186 0.213 0.226 0.585
Notes: The dependent variable is log per capita water use. Column(1)-(2) are cross-section
estimation for water use in April. Column (3)-(4) are pooled regression results including
weather control and monthly dummies separately. Column(5) presents fixed effects results.
Unit of precipitation here is meter. The coefficient for max age is multiplied by 10. Household
Head (HH) gender=1 for males. All the regressions also control group committee dummies.
Robust errors in parentheses. + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 4.3: Household Characteristics and Total Water and electricity consumption
(1) (2) (3)
log (water) log (Electric.) log (per capita electric.)
Family Size -0.00724 0.0582*** -0.230***
(0.0156) (0.0114) (0.0115)
# of Female 0.0732*** 0.0367* 0.0498**
(0.0212) (0.0153) (0.0155)
Max age -0.0311* -0.0390*** -0.00939
(0.0122) (0.00904) (0.00901)
HH Gender 0.117 0.0451 0.0196
(0.173) (0.0884) (0.0965)
Precipitation -0.706*** -4.973*** -4.977***
(0.162) (0.345) (0.347)
Temperature 0.0206*** 0.0223*** 0.0224***
(0.00316) (0.00215) (0.00216)
N 2579 5863 5863
Adjusted R2 0.036 0.098 0.184
Notes: These are pooled OLS regression results. The time range of water is from April to
August in 2009. The time range of electricity is from September 2007 to May 2009 (every
other month). Unit of precipitation here is meter. The coefficient for max age is multiplied
by 10. Household Head (HH) gender=1 for males. All the regressions also control group
committee dummies. Robust errors in parentheses. + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, ***
p < 0.001
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Table 4.4: Fixed Effects Estimation of Water and electricity consumption Response to
Weather Variability
Log (Water) Log(Electricity)
Precipitation -0.823*** -4.914*** -6.485***
(0.123) (0.231) (0.680)
Temperature 0.0199*** 0.0221*** 0.248***
(0.00229) (0.00142) (0.0184)
Household FE Y Y Y
Year FE - Y
Month FE - Y
N 2579 5863 5863
Adjusted R2 0.480 0.636 0.088
Notes: The time range of water is from April to August in 2009. The time range of electricity
is from September 2007 to May 2009 (every other month). Unit of precipitation here is meter.
Standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Table 4.5: Household Characteristics and Water Use Response to Temperature (FE)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Precipitation -0.836*** -0.823*** -0.823*** -0.823*** -0.823***
(0.124) (0.123) (0.123) (0.123) (0.123)
Temperature 0.0231* -0.0127 0.0259*** 0.0360*** 0.0199***
(0.00906) (0.0286) (0.00512) (0.00711) (0.00229)








N 2558 2579 2579 2579 2579
Adjusted R2 0.584 0.585 0.585 0.586 0.585
Notes: The dependent variable here is log per capita water use. Unit of precipitation here
is meter. Household Head (HH) gender=1 for males. Standard errors in parentheses. +
p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
150
Table 4.6: Cross-sectional Analysis on Water Use Adjustment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Water use change (April-July) Water use change (July-August)
log(per capita -0.268+ -0.162 0.0133 0.0996
electricity) (0.159) (0.156) (0.0953) (0.0764)
Family Size -0.236+ -0.132 -0.0506 -0.0732
(0.133) (0.130) (0.0998) (0.0778)
# of Female 0.0230 -0.0336 0.0681 0.183+
(0.180) (0.188) (0.139) (0.105)
Max age -0.0224 -0.0763 0.0125 -0.0503
(0.114) (0.120) (0.0884) (0.0611)
HH Gender 1.380** 1.306*** -0.488* 0.457
(0.451) (0.324) (0.235) (0.342)




N 545 508 545 515
Adjusted R2 0.024 0.069 0.023 0.456
Notes: The dependent variable for Column(1)-(2) is the difference between water use in
July and April(increasing water use period). The dependent variable for Column(3)-(4) is
the difference between water use in August and July (decreasing water use period). Unit of
precipitation here is meter. Household Head (HH) gender=1 for males. All the regressions
include household characteristics of HH gender, family size, # of females, max age and group
belonging. Robust errors in parentheses. + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 4.7: Household Characteristics and Electricity Consumption Response to Temperature
(FE)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Precipitation -4.308*** -4.246*** -4.247*** -4.247*** -4.246***
(0.239) (0.240) (0.240) (0.240) (0.240)
Temperature 0.0324*** 0.0121 0.0146*** 0.0147*** 0.0136***
(0.00338) (0.0100) (0.00211) (0.00268) (0.00143)








N 5831 5863 5863 5863 5863
Adjusted R2 0.602 0.600 0.601 0.600 0.601
Notes: The dependent variable here is log per capita electricity consumption. Unit of pre-
cipitation here is meter. Household Head (HH) gender=1 for males. Standard errors in
parentheses. + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Figure 4.1: Location of Nanhe Village in China
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Figure 4.2: Distribution of per capita Water Use in April and July
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Figure 4.3: Monthly Temperature and Precipitation of Nanhe Village in 2009
Notes: This graph plots monthly average temperature and precipitation of Nanhe Village in
2009. Red line represents temperature and blue line represents precipitation. Shaded area
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Figure 4.4: 95% Confidence Interval of Month Dummies For Per Capita Water Use
Notes: This graph plots the estimates and 95% confidence interval of month dummies using
regression model in Column(4) of Table 4.2.
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Chapter 5
Implications and future work
In general, these studies show that in the context of top-down decision system in China, both
governments and households respond to environmental changes using their own resources in
the decision making process. The responses are reflected from intergovernmental transfers
response to revenue changes coupled with environmental changes caused by large hydropower
dam projects, intergovernmental transfer increases for local typhoon disaster relief and indi-
vidual adjustment on water and electricity use for weather variabilities. Especially, results
on the governmental studies imply that the top-down decision system has its own advantage
of redistributing impacts from large projects and sharing risks among many areas.
Globally there have been wide debates about whether or not and in which fields to increase
or decrease decentralization. High decentralization has the advantage of smaller information
costs and more flexible in locally-tailored decision making. However, relatively centralized
system have the advantages of risk sharing, equalization redistribution and facilitating large
scale projects. China has gone through a process of centralization in the 1960s-1970s, de-
centralization in the 1980s-early 1990s for the reform and development and re-centralization
in the 1990s. In the recent few years, there have been a partial-decentralization trend
represented by the “province manages county" reform promoted nationally. Besides the in-
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stitutional structure, there are other factors, such as governmental evaluation system and
environment right system, can be improved to increase the efficiency and equity of envi-
ronmental decision makings. These are all potential study subjects following the line of
environmental decision making.
One thing worth notice is that there are many other factors of environmental decision
making not covered in this dissertation, such as environment property rights, information
transparency and governor evaluation system. They all can potentially impact the equity
and efficiency results for environmental decisions. China as an experience field provides
many chances to study the impacts of these factors on environmental decisions of various
decision makers, because there are a lot of cross-sectional and temporal variations of these
factors in the local level.
Considering the increasing trend of both large projects and climate risks driven by eco-
nomic development and climate change in the future, findings in this can provide basic
knowledge understanding the environmental decision making in developing countries and
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